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§ 3

SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF THE REALITY OF GOD

I. First, some characteristics, which concern God considered in Himself.

1. Above all, God is, as we have repeatedly seen, an absolutely absolute reality. If we wish to refer to the metaphysical essence of God as done in classical theology, that is, to that concept, which (according to our new way of thinking) would be the first and radical one by which we conceive God, I think that the metaphysical essence of God is to be an absolutely absolute reality. Indeed, this is something we have already seen: an absolutely absolute reality is the reality, which is “in and by itself” full and absolute reality qua reality. At first glance this might seem to be another way of expressing what some classical theologians thought when saying that the metaphysical essence of God consisted in the identity of his essence with his existence, i.e., God would be that entity to whose essence pertains existing. But to my way of thinking, this is not correct either with respect to the two terms (essence and existence) or to their alleged identity. One might think it would be enough to conceive that existence belongs to the divine essence, i.e., that its essence is existential. But the fact is that we would have to add that in God his existence is pure essentiality (essential existence). God is distinct from existing things not only by virtue of that in which He consists, i.e., because existing pertains to that in which God consists; but He also differs from existing things by {166} reason of His very existence, what we call “to exist” is in God something toto cælo different than what we call “to exist” when referring to real things. From this follows that God is not a formal identity of essence and existence in the classical sense, but is a reality, which through elevation is not only above and beyond the difference of essence and existence, but also above and beyond its alleged identity. This is so because reality always consists in being “de suyo”. And absolutely absolute reality is the absolute de suyo, something, which by elevation is above and beyond the difference and identity mentioned. In God essence and existence are identical because He is the fullness of the de suyo in and by Himself, and not the other way around, as if He were the absolutely absolute reality because in Him essence and existence were formally identical. Therefore, we must not confuse the “in and by himself” with this identity. The metaphysical essence of God is to be absolutely absolute reality.

2. This reality is one and unique. We have actually come to this reality because it is the fundament of the reality of real things qua real. Now, the reality of things is intrinsically and formally respective. In virtue of this, all things constitute a world. World is, for me, the respectivity of the real qua real. The world is, therefore, one and unique. By being its fundament, God is essentially one and unique also. Aristotle thought that the Theós as supreme substance is the unmoved mover of the cosmos. But if there were different kósmoi, one would have to say that there would also be different unmoved movers, that is, different gods. And he admitted this through the astronomy of Eudoxus, which counts 47 or 55 independent celestial spheres. But in my conceptualization one must distinguish carefully between cosmos and world. Cosmos is the {167} unity of real things by reason of their own nature, of what I have usually called their “suchness”. From this point of view there would be no problem in admitting the possibility of different kósmoi independent from each other, that is, without any type of interaction. They would not constitute a universe, but a pluriverse. Nevertheless, this is not the point of view we must take on the question at hand. All these kósmoi, though “cosmically” independent, are indeed “really” respective as realities. Whence, even though it might be possible to have different kósmoi, it is metaphysically impossible to have different worlds. The world is not, and cannot be anything but one and unique. Thus, God as fundament of the world cannot be anything else but one and unique also. Not having distinguished cosmos and world constitutes a serious failure by Aristotle in this problem. Polytheism is metaphysically impossible: uniqueness is a characteristic of God. Here uniqueness does not mean a numerical characteristic, but something transnumerical. Uniqueness is an internal and formal characteristic of the divine reality. It is not the case that the absolutely absolute reality is unique because there are no others, but rather, on the contrary, there can be no others because the absolutely absolute reality is, in and by itself, absolutely one.

3. The absolutely absolute reality is a reality of absolute concretion. God is not a vaporous absolute, because He is not “the” absolute, but “the reality”, which is absolutely absolute. And this reality is concrete. It is not a case of taking the concrete as opposed to the abstract, but of taking it as primary absolute concretion. It is not a concretized reality, but a reality absolutely concrete. Its absolutely absolute character carries with it the absolute {168} concretion; a concretion, which does not constitute its reality, but on the contrary, is an absolute, which as absolute, “brings forth” (this is an inevitable anthropomorphic language) in itself the concretion of the absolute. This absolute concretion incorporates different aspects.

a) The absolutely absolute reality is eo ipso a reality absolutely “its-own”. It consists, then, in absolute “its-ownness”. Therefore, it is essentially personal, because personhood formally consists in its-ownness. If God were not absolutely His-own, He would not be absolutely absolute. In His absolute concretion, God is essentially personal.

b) Because He is absolutely absolute reality, He is absolute “dynamism”. Every reality qua reality is in fact dynamic, not only in itself (which is obvious), but as I see it, by itself. Dynamism is neither action nor operation; to my way of thinking, it is what I have called “self-giving” (“dar de sí”). Every reality is real by being the plenitude of that, which it is; and this plenitude is a moment of the “self-giving”, a formal moment as such. Dynamism is not consequent upon reality as action or operation might be, but is a constitutive moment of it, of its formal constitution qua reality. And so, God, as absolutely absolute reality, is absolute dynamism, an absolute “self-giving”. Since by virtue of being absolutely absolute reality He is absolutely “His-own”, it follows that this self-giving cannot be transitive, either in the sense of making another out of Himself, or in the sense of making Himself out of Himself. It is a giving to Himself that, which He already is as His-own. It is, then, purely and simply auto-possession in His-ownness. Now, auto-possession is that in which life formally consists. Because of this, auto-possession in absolute its-ownness is Absolute Life. In it God does not make himself as a reality, that is, {169} the divine life is not a becoming; the only thing that in this life “occurs” (if I may be permitted such expression) is the plenary actuality of the absolutely absolute reality for itself: absolute auto-possession is but “auto-actuality”. Therefore, God is absolute life because He is absolutely His-own, i.e., because He is a person. Contrary to what is usually said, I consider that God is not a person because He is living, but is living because He is a person. His life, his auto-possession, is founded in his His-ownness. That God has absolute auto-possession means that His possession is a consequence of the fact that the autos is absolute dynamism; and this is so because He is an absolutely absolute reality, i.e., absolutely His own, indeed, because He is a person. We can then affirm that the absolute concretion of the divine His-ownness is to be life.

c) What comprises this auto-possession? Auto-possession is, as we have indicated, absolute actuality for itself. This actuality is, above all, actuality in the sense of presence of reality to itself. Also, this actuality is what formally constitutes what we call “intelligence”. In virtue of this, the divine life is first and foremost life in intelligence. And since the actuality of the real in intelligence is what I have called real truth, it follows that divine life consists in being its own real truth. But this is not enough, because auto-possession is essentially possession, that kind of active repose in itself, in its own reality, i.e., fruition. Fruition is repose in the plenitude of one's own reality. And so, this actuality in the sense of fruition is what formally constitutes that, which we call “volition”. Therein, if we may put it this way, the plenary its-ownness of the absolutely absolute reality is consummated. By virtue of this, the divine life as {170} absolute is auto-fruition in auto-presence; it is fruition in its own real truth. In God, the absolute actuality of His reality as His-ownness is intelligent and volitional life. God not only has intelligence and volition, but is necessarily intelligent and volitional because He is absolute His-ownness, because He is a person. As seen from the perspective of men, in God intelligence and volition are the two aspects according to which the absolutely absolute reality possesses itself, the two aspects according to which God is His-own. The concretion of the absolutely absolute reality, of reality absolutely His-own, is absolute life; and the concretion of absolute life is intelligence and volition. In men, the his-ownness is consequent upon the nature of that, which constitutes our substantive reality: we are persons because we are intelligent and volitional. Intelligence and volition are the mere factum of our substantive reality; and only by presupposing this factum are we persons necessarily. We are persons as a “result of” or by “implantation in” reality: human personhood is the mode of implantation in reality. Because of this, the being of man is relatively absolute. But in God His substantive reality is absolute; therefore, it is absolutely His-own; He possesses Himself absolutely, and consequently is intelligent and volitional. In God, to my way of thinking, personhood is not consequent upon substantive reality nor upon His life, but is the very principle of it. Intelligence and volition are the way of being absolutely His-own, the way of realizing Himself with respect to what He already is as person. This clearly shows that, in God, intelligence and volition are necessary intrinsic moments of His substantive reality. The His-ownness is the fundament of life, and life is the fundament of intelligence and volition.

{171} Recapitulating, God is a reality absolutely personal, in a dynamism of absolute life, auto-actual in intelligence and volition. Here we find the absolute concretion of the absolutely absolute reality. We have developed the point without reference to sentiment, but the same can be said of sentiment as affection of His own reality.

Even at the risk of tiresome repetitions I beg indulgence to insist particularly on two points. In the first place, classical philosophy and theology have founded the characteristics we have expressed in just the reverse order. They began by stating that man and God are two “analogous” realities because of intelligence and volition. By virtue of this and in an eminent way, God would have life and be a person. But to my way of thinking, the order of fundamentation has to be the reverse. That upon, which the analogy has to be based primarily and formally is upon the character of “absolute”: man in his relatively absolute being, God in his absolutely absolute reality. This is the primary and radical analogy: the analogy of the absolute. Therefore, it is not the case of a vague formal likeness of our intelligence and volition to the divine intelligence and volition, but that this “likeness” is founded on the “analogical” character of the absolute. From this follows that while in man his intelligent and volitional life is the reason for his personhood, in God His absolute personhood is the reason that He is alive and his life is intelligent and volitional. This is the first observation.

The second refers to the characteristics of God themselves. When we say that God is personal, living, intelligent, volitional, etc., we must avoid the serious error of taking these {172} terms in an anthropomorphical sense, as if God were a kind of gigantic human spirit, although purified of all the human limitations. This is absurd. How the reality of God may be in itself, it is impossible for us to know. Consequently, the aforementioned characteristics have to be taken in the strict sense according to which we have proceeded to conceive them. When we say that God is personal, the only thing we say is that He is a reality absolutely His-own. When we say that He is living, we understand that God is a reality, which fully possesses itself. When we say that He is intelligent and volitional, we wish to express purely and simply that He is absolute actuality of His own transparent reality and sufficient to itself, etc. Neither should feeling (sentimiento) be conceived anthropomorphically. That these characteristics may also be found in man in some measure, cannot be denied. But we should observe, first, that we have not arrived at them through man, but through what the absolutely absolute reality is. And second, that if man possesses them it is precisely because his being is relatively absolute, i.e., because God possesses them in an absolutely absolute way. God is not a kind of immense spirit or soul but rather absolutely absolute reality. From this stem the characteristics, which concern God insofar as He is formally and constitutively present in things.

II. God is, with respect to real things, the foundational reality: I would call it realitas fundamentalis. Fundamentality is a character of the absolutely absolute reality. It is not a constitutive moment of absolutely absolute reality, but rather consequent upon it, because the absolutely absolute reality, precisely by being such, is real in and by itself, {173} and not because it is the foundation of real things. Real things are founded upon the absolutely absolute reality, though the latter is independent of the former. Therefore, the foundational characteristic of God is not constitutive of their reality, but merely consequent upon it. Fundamentality is not their ratio essendi. At most it would be their ratio cognoscendi; actually we cannot know God by ourselves except as fundament of real things. This is essential for the problem of God. For the time being the question remains open about the type of that “consequentness”.

This fundamentality is a characteristic of God by virtue of being absolutely absolute reality and in His whole concretion, i.e., as personal, living, intelligent, volitional, etc. But here it is necessary to reflect a bit in order to eliminate some ideas, which may readily be propounded, viz. that the fundamentality of God may consist primarily and formally in His intelligence, in His volition, and in His sentiment as such. To my way of thinking this is not correct. Man needs an intelligence to open himself to the power of the real, because his being is relatively absolute. But God, as an absolutely absolute reality, does not need to open himself to reality; rather, He constitutes it from Himself directly, in a manner of speaking. God is certainly foundational in His whole absolute concretion, which means that His fundamentality is intelligent and volitional; formally, however, He is not so, insofar as He is intelligent and volitional, but insofar as this intelligence and this volition are absolutely absolute. God is not fundamenting things as a kind of spirit underlying them; this would be an absurd animism. God is fundamenting things as an absolute self-giving. To fundament is to self-give.

{174} Hence, that God is fundamental or foundational means that He self-gives reality, the reality of things. As I indicated above, the precise nature of this giving remains an open question because the giving is multiple.

Three characteristics pin down the nature of this fundamentality.

1. Above all, fundamentality is presence of God in things. As we saw, it has the character of a formal presence. It is not a presence derived from its eventual effector character, but on the contrary, God is effector in order to be present in things in a formal way, as their foundational formality. And as this formal presence concerns the character of reality of each thing, it turns out that this formal presence is intrinsic to real things. Not every intrinsic presence is formal, but every formal presence is intrinsic. That is, the presence of God is formal to things, and only because it is formal is it also intrinsic. Furthermore, it is what is most radically intrinsic in them because, as I just pointed out, it concerns reality precisely as reality. However, that God is present in real things as intrinsic foundational formality does not mean that between God and things there is no real distinction. It only means that there is no “separation”, either physical or metaphysical. Distinction is not separation. This characteristic, according to which God is present in things with a formal and intrinsic presence, yet things are not God, is precisely what I call the transcendence of God “in” reality. A formal and intrinsic presence is a transcendent presence. Here is the first characteristic of the fundamentality of God: transcendence.

Nevertheless, it is necessary to fix the exact meaning of {175} this transcendence. To my way of thinking, to transcend does not mean to be “beyond” things, because on the contrary, God is formally and intrinsically in them. The transcendence of God does not consist in being beyond things, but the other way around. Transcendence is precisely a mode of being in them, that mode in accordance with which they could not be real in any sense, unless they formally included in their reality the reality of God, without this in any sense making God identical to the reality of things. The way God is in things is to be transcendent in them. And this is, to my way of thinking, what is essential about the divine transcendence: not to be “transcendent to” things, but to be “transcendent in” things themselves. For this reason I shall constantly use the expression “God transcendent in things”, the precise meaning of which we have once and for all explained. Each thing, in what it is, in and by itself, has in itself its own transcendent formal foundation. From this it follows that each thing leads us, not to go out of the thing itself, but to enter into it deeper and deeper, into its own transcendent foundation. To be in the thing is to be transcending it, not outside, but inside the thing itself. To be in the full reality of a thing is eo ipso to be in God in it. As we shall see, to march towards God is to penetrate further and further into a thing. Each thing itself makes me transcend in it.

The preceeding allows us to forcefully eliminate two serious errors, between which it has been common to oscillate. The first is the error of thinking that the formal presence of God in things turns them into moments of the unique reality of God: this is pantheism. It is impossible. God is formally in things, but “making” that they be in God realities different from Him. Here “making” {176} simply means “founding”. The “in” is an “other-ifying” (if I may be permitted the expression) “in”. Things are different from God precisely and formally because God is “in” them, but transcendent. The second error is the opposite. It consists in thinking that because He is radically different from things, God is the great absence, the great foreign to the world: this is agnosticism in its varied forms. In all of them, this is the extreme way of conceiving God as “beyond” things. But it is equally impossible. The fact that God is not things does not consist in His being distanced from them. If this were so, things would not be real. That God is in things, means that things are real only by formally “including” in their own reality that reality, which is greater than themselves, God. God is transcendent, but in them. The transcendence of God is neither identity nor remoteness, but transcendence in things. The realitas fundamentalis is, above all, a transcendence in this sense. The transcendence “in” makes God to be, in some sense, intra-worldly.

2. God is transcendent in real things qua real. Furthermore, any reality is, qua reality, constitutively respective. And this unity of respectivity is what I have called “world”. Hence, the formal and transcendent presence of God in things is a presence in the whole world as such. God is transcendent in things, and because of this He is transcendent in the world. Indeed, for the same reason that the transcendence of God is not identity or remoteness, the presence of God in the world is neither remoteness nor identity. It is not remoteness because God is not the “other” world. God is not extra-worldly, He is absolutely intra-worldly. But He is not identity either: God is not the other world, but is other than the {177} world in which He is, because His otherness is just the formal fundament of the respectivity of the real qua real, i.e., the fundament of the world. To the unity of the world corresponds not only the uniqueness of God, but also the very worldliness of God. God is not present in the world simply because He is present in each and every thing, but rather He is present in the world precisely, and formally because any real thing is essentially and constitutively worldly. God is simply transcendent “in” the world. The fundamentality of God is the worldly transcendence of God. The world formally carries God in itself.

3. This presence of God in things is not only formal and intrinsic, but also constituting. The reality of God, in its whole fundamenting concretion, is an absolute self-giving. On this point the absolute of the self-giving means that He is giving reality to things, constituting them as real. The presence of God in things is a constituting self-giving. This means He is in things “making them be real”, i.e., making them be de suyo, and to act from what they are de suyo. This is what I have usually called the fontanality of the absolutely absolute reality. God is realitas fontanalis. In the special case of man, this is what comprises what I have called “theological tension”; the sheer fontanality in everything real is the homolog of the theological tension in man. The transcendence of the reality of God is a fontanal transcendence.

This is the definitive essence of the fundamentality of God: to be fontanal transcendence. And He is such because He is an absolutely absolute reality. Precisely because this reality is absolutely concrete, His fontanality is {178} also personal, living, intelligent and volitional. We have seen before that God is a possibilitating and impelling ultimateness because He is the fundament of the power of the real, of a power in its turn ultimate, possibilitating and impelling. Hence, we now understand why He is, and has to be what He is, since we are viewing God not only from the perspective of real things, but from Himself also. It is because He is personal, living, intelligent and volitional that God is in Himself adequately, an ultimate, possibilitating, and impelling fontanal reality. That is why His manifestation in the power of the real is what makes of this power something likewise ultimate, possibilitating and impelling, which in turn constitutes the fundament of religation. This is, to my way of thinking, the intellectual justification of the reality of God.

But the problem has a second aspect: the access of man to this reality, the access of man to God. There are, as I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, two co-essential aspects here: the reality of God and the access of man to God. It will be useful to deal with them separately. This may generate some inevitable tedious repetitions; however, it may also provide us with greater clarity. Let us then take on the problem of the access of man to God.