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CHAPTER 5
WESTERN PHILOSOPHY (4)
KANT
§ 1
INTRODUCTION. THE HORIZON OF NOTHINGNESS.
OBJECTUALITY
Kant is not satisfied with this conceptiveness of the metaphysics of Leibniz. That is the question.
However, he begins by accepting the same horizon in which the philosophy of Leibniz and Wolff has formally been located. In the first place, that horizon is creation, the horizon of nothingness. For Kant, God appears as creator —this idea has never been abandoned by Kant throughout his entire philosophy—, a creator God that certainly has an intellect —intuitus originarius he calls it. Here “original” is not original only with respect to the human intellect, which would be derivative (we shall soon see in what sense it is derivative). Here “original” means that it is originator. Divine intellection, needing a creative fiat —Kant never disputes this—, is an intuitus originans. Things, insofar as produced by an act of divine will, but on the line of that {184} originating intellection, are precisely things in themselves, things as they are in themselves, they are “Dinge an sich”.
He expressly tells us in the Critique of Pure Reason1. Things in themselves are precisely the terminus of the intuitus originarius. Anticipating ideas, there is another very meaningful paragraph of Kant written a few years before his death, where he tells us, “God is creator of the world as thing in itself, but just as it appears to us, it is a creation of our own sensibility”2. Putting aside the second part of the affirmation, let us pay attention to the first. Things in themselves are precisely things insofar as terminus originated by an intuitus originans, originarius. Up to this point that is what Leibniz would literally say.
In the second place, on this horizon man as finite reason performs a certain kind of knowing. He acquires a particular knowledge about being, about entity. This knowledge is the one that constitutes metaphysics. Indeed, Kant has no doubt in saying that this is what Metaphysics is, “Philosophical knowledge by pure reason (aus reiner Vernunft) in its systematic connection, is called metaphysics”3. This is exactly what Wolff and Leibniz have said when affirming that metaphysics is the science of the first principles of human reason. Although he puts it in a different way, Kant exactly reproduces the idea of Leibniz.
That Metaphysics, according to Kant, has four parts4.
First part: Ontology
Second part: Rational Psychology
Third part: Rational Cosmology
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Fourth part: Rational Theology
This is exactly the division proper to the philosophical encyclopedia of Leibniz and Wolff. But here is where the difficulty begins for Kant.
These two things, that the intuitus originarius may have produced things having some characteristics, what things are in themselves, and what human reason may know about them through concepts, in what kind of relationship do they stand? That is the question, the relationship of things in themselves and the knowledge about them that may be acquired through that system of concepts. In other words, the relationship between metaphysics and things themselves.
Kant exposes that great difficulty, in the first place, in a manner we might call extrinsic, which is the most telling from the point of view of history, pointing to what has happened to metaphysics, to that presumed strict science of reason.
Thus, in the first paragraph of the “Introduction” to the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason Kant tells us, “Human reason has a special destiny with respect to a particular type of its own knowledge loaded with questions (dass sie durch Fragen belästig wird) that cannot be eliminated because they are posed precisely by the very nature of reason, but cannot be answered because they transcend (übersteigen) all the powers of human reason”5.
Here we find again the term “perplexity” (Verlegenheit) with which Aristotle designated Metaphysics. It is the Kantian version of the Aristotelian aporía, which will reappear once more in Hegel, as we shall see. Reason precisely finds itself in this aporía through no guilt of its own (ohne ihre Schuld). Next he makes an exposition as to why {186} reason has fallen into that predicament, and has had to reach for principles that transcend experience, which are not firm. This has been the origin of all kinds of discussions and arguments. Kant says, “the arena of these interminable discussions is called metaphysics (der Kampfplatz dieserendlosen Streitigkeiten heisst nun Metaphysik)”6. For Kant this means —he tells us next, and in the “Introduction” to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason— that Metaphysics, with all its presumed knowledge of things by pure reason does nothing more than spin the noria without getting anywhere, it is a blosses Herumtappen7 that, as Kant says, has not yet entered, has not undertaken the secure way of science (den sicheren Gang einer Wissenschaft). As a historical confirmation this is undeniable, who could possibly claim that Kant has said something that is not true? What is important now is to see what Kant thinks has produced this situation, where is the location of the problem for Kant. That is where the difficulty resides.
Hence, if we think about what Descartes and Leibniz have said the matter seems obvious. In one form or another, for Leibniz as for Descartes, human reason actually knows things, but which ones? Knows those that exist by themselves, no doubt about that. Certainly, this is not free from difficulties, but Descartes resolves the difficulty by saying that the divine veracity exists, which has placed things in accord with human intellection. It is not the case that He has placed human intellection in accordance with things, but the other way around, has placed things in accordance with human intellection. The world has a rational structure. Therefore, it does not mean that reason has a {187} cosmic structure, but that the world has a rational structure. Of course, the creational paradigm —if you will— of God is just the order of reason, the transcendental order. In the case of Leibniz, the matter is clearer still. We know things in themselves simply by the very type of our reason, which against what Descartes pretends, is a reason similar to the divine one, image of the divine reason. Therefore, by its own structure is made for a limited knowledge of that which in an unlimited and infinite way the divine reason knows, i.e., things as they are in themselves.
But now, here is where the difficulty begins for Kant, because for Kant human reason is essentially different from the divine reason; however, it is intrinsically necessary. Here is where the difficulty resides. Human reason is essentially different from the divine reason. In the first place, the divine reason makes things; human reason does not make them, it has them right in front of itself, and has to know them, it wishes to know them. Human reason has an intrinsic finitude, something that would not be disagreeable —we shall soon return to this point— to Leibniz and Descartes.
In the second place, reason has to receive the things that are given to it in order to know them. Here a moment appears, not only of finitude, but if you will, of fact, of donation.
In the third place, it is not enough with this; it has to make of the given an object of knowledge, an object of thought.
These three moments, finitude, receptivity, and objectuality (with thinkability8) are those that at one and the same time constitute what essentially differentiates human reason from divine reason. Of course, each one of these moments is directed to the other. Thus, finitude —we shall see this immediately— is expressed in terms of receptivity; receptivity in {188} terms of being a candidate for objectuality. Therefore, by a posteriori denominating this essential structure of human reason, we might say that human reason is a reason constituted by objectuality.
Thus, the horizon of nothingness, which at the forefront had placed the intrinsic finitude of entity for St. Thomas, the uncertainty of intelligence for Descartes and possibility before reality for Leibniz, for Kant, it places something completely different, namely, objectuality ahead of the thing itself. Here is where Kant is going to anchor his whole reflection about metaphysics and the transcendental order.
It is necessary to cover these Kantian considerations and we shall divide them into two parts.
In the first place, the position of the problem for Kant.
In the second place, the stepping march of this problem.
With this, let me anticipate —although I will soon return to this idea— that everything that has been claimed trying to present Kantian philosophy as a philosophy of science is completely false. Of course, science has its place in Kantian philosophy, but Kantian philosophy is not a theory of science, but a transcendental philosophy, as he clearly indicates.
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§ 2
THE PROBLEM OF KANT
What is the problem of Kant? This must be studied concretely, not only with respect to the characteristics of things, but also with respect to the characteristics of the human reason that knows them.
In the first place, with respect to the characteristics of things. These are the three moments we have just covered. By reason of its turning to objects human reason is intrinsically finite, it moves among respectivities, and makes of what is received an object of its own. It is necessary to make these three terms adequately precise, something that is not so simple as it might seem at first sight.
What does Kant understand by finitude (Endlichkeit)? He tells us that human reason does not produce things, but knows them. This is true, but the intention of Kant is much deeper. He is trying to tell us in what the very finitude of human reason consists, which is also finite for Descartes, Leibniz, and St. Thomas. This finitude, does it simply consist in not having the same reach as the divine? In other words, is it because it knows things less and knows them poorly? This is clear and it is what has been said up to now, but the position of Kant is completely different. It is not only the case that human reason may know less and may be a poorer knowledge than the one of divine reason, but that what it knows, is known in a different way. Here begins the question, that it knows it in a different way means that it knows it finitely. It is, then, an internal and intrinsic way of finitude. The way of knowing, and not precisely {190} the ambit of the known is what constitutes the radical finitude of human reason for Kant.
In what does this radical finitude consist as a way of knowing? Here the second note appears. It knows in a finite manner because it needs for the objects to be given, that is the receptivity. On this point there would not be an essential discrepancy between Kant, Descartes, and Leibniz. Clearly, in one form or another, for Descartes and Leibniz things are given, human reason does not pull them out of his head.
All this is true, but the difference is greater in Kant. Because for Kant, even though the objects may not be given in their perfect individual concretion within what he rightly calls, together with almost all of the previous philosophy, intuitus, intuition, that intuition is not originating, is not original, as we have already seen. But we must issue a warning that previously “original” was not opposed to the derivative. Here, on the other hand, the original is opposed to the derivative. It is not the case that human intuition may be derived from the divine intuition, but that it is derived from things, while divine intuition produces things. Facing the hervorbringen, the producing, is the empfangen, the giving; it is a receptivity; the given exactly and formally means that which is received. Of course, not everything that is given would have to be necessarily received. Putting it this way in the abstract, to have confused the given with the received has been one of the great arguments with which the Thomists fighters have charged against Molina, thinking that the scientia media substitutes the knowledge of God with that of things. If by substituting is understood that there have to be things for God to know them, there is no doubt about this; but that does not mean that the divine intellect is receptive, it means that it is a posteriori, which is something different. Be that as it may, here the moment of receptivity is absolutely necessary. Intuition insofar as receptive is just {191} what constitutes the sensible affection. Thus far, man has an intuition (a sign of his intrinsic finitude) in which the objects are not only given to him, but are given through an affective intuition, i.e., in an impression, internal or external, it does not matter, it is a sensible intuition. With this Kant completely roots out something that was dear to the philosophy of Leibniz, namely, intellectual intuition. Leibniz considered that there was an intelligible intuition, the intuition of being, and by the spirit intuiting itself, it was more or less intuiting being. For Kant, on the other hand, there is no other intuition but sensible intuition.
What happens is that this sensible intuition is not knowledge in any order. To intuit an object is not to know it, in this world or in the other. To see the Holy Trinity face to face in heaven is not to understand it, a thing that no one can do, not even the finite, human intelligence of Christ; that can only be done by God, who is the Word. It is not enough to have intuition in order to have knowledge. They are two different things.
For this reason, man has to return upon that, which is given under the form of sensible affection; man not only has to receive it passively, but also has to make of it an object of thought.
What is intuited as object is precisely the third characteristic of the difference between the human reason and the divine, and the second characteristic of the finitude of human intelligence. Reason is finite because it knows in another way, which consists in knowing something that is received in a sensible intuition, and also because what is received has to be made into an object of thought. Up to this, it appears there would be no great problem with Descartes and Leibniz, but the difference is radical and essential.
{192} Kant radically distinguishes —we return to the starting point— things, such as they have been produced by the originative intellect, and the things man proposes to know because they are given by sensibility through sensible intuition. This means that for Kant, to be a thing and to be an object, are two completely different dimensions. There are many things that are not (not only in fact, but that they can never be) an object of human intellection; this can actually happen. But, in second place, and more importantly, in those that are object, the conditions that make them possible as things, are not the same as the conditions that make them possible as objects. The conditions that have made them possible as things are accomplished since the thing is there; however, I have to make an object of that thing, and to be an object is not given. Here is where we must pay extra attention in order to try to unravel the Kantian problem.
Since the time of Aristotle reality had been qualified as the primary entity of reality, as a hypokeímenon, as a sub-jectum, as a substance, something that underlies the properties, which as such cannot have a separated existence. If they had a separated existence they would not be properties, but would be independent substances. Naturally, here the sub-jectum is a “sub” with respect to the properties it has. And this remained more or less in that form throughout medieval philosophy; that is why for a medieval to say that something is sub-jectivum means that it has the maximum of reality. Not “subjective” in our modern sense, but that it is a real and effective subject, a hypokeímenon, in the Aristotelian sense of the term. But this reality, which is a sub-ject, has suffered an enormous vicissitude through all the philosophy from Descartes to Kant.
Indeed, the first thing we ask about it is how {193} can human reason know it. With this, the difference between the sub-jectum and its properties completely recedes to a secondary plane. What remains on the first plane is that this, towards which the human mind is directed, is certainly a jectum, but a jectum that is not a “sub”, but an “ob”, right in front of me, an objectum. In this situation, the objectum is not contrasted to some properties under which it might exist; that makes no sense. The only thing that would merit the name of object and would be underneath, not of some properties, but of the very characteristic of the objectum is precisely the human subjectum. With this the term subjectum has ceased to mean the physical reality of the subject of all entities in the universe, in order to simply and purely mean that the only authentic and real subject in this philosophy is the human subjectum. It is precisely to this human subjectum that an objectum is present. The primary characteristic of things, for Kant, is just to be objecta, not subjecta. In German the matter is clear, objectum is Gegen-stand, what is in front of me. Not to have distinguished those two dimensions of the problem, the objectuality of things and the subjectivity in the Aristotelian and classical sense of the term, is what constitutes for Kant the dogmatism of the previous metaphysics. It is not the case of dogmatism in the sense of unconditional criticisms or poorly made criticisms; it means purely and simply to have just taken the “object” of thought as a subjectum reale. This is what dogmatism is for Kant, not to have distinguished between the objectum and the thing itself.
We are now able to understand why objectuality has taken first place on the horizon of nothingness. Because actually, man, abandoned to his intrinsic finitude on the horizon of nothingness precisely encounters objecta. The first thing he has to investigate is what these objects are, {194} with which the human mind has to deal. Here we have, then, the Kantian problem on the side that concerns things.
Let us now consider the Kantian problem with respect to the side that concerns the very character of reason. Reason has to make “objects” out of things in order to investigate what they are, since intuition in itself is not knowledge. But then, what is that making and what is that thinking? The answer of Kant is final and clear; to think in this case is to judge (Urteilen). Human reason, inasmuch as it operates this function of judging, is what Kant calls understanding9. What is to judge? At the hands of Leibniz, to judge had been to refer a concept to another by means of an exhaustive analysis of the concepts of subject and predicate, in order to see how the requirements of one are included in the requirements of the other. The judgment in this form would be a process, an essentially analytical function of reason. The judgment would consist in decomposing things down to their ultimate elements and from them, to see how through a sufficient reason the complexity of things emerges.
But this is not what Kant understands by judging. Kant understands that judging —let us not forget he cannot put aside his sensible intuition— is a function of concepts. This means to refer a concept to something given, to something that exists, therefore, prior to the concept and in this sense is present beyond the concept. Consequently, the function of judging does not consist in analyzing concepts, but in going from a concept to something that is not in the concept itself, which faces what things are. In Kantian terms, the formal {195} and radical structure of reason is not analytical, but synthetic; synthesis consists in precisely going from the concept to the thing.
Reason for Kant, against Leibniz, is essentially synthetic10. It is such because of what we have just said, because in its intrinsic finitude it has to make itself an “object”, but of something, which is given to it. Consequently, reason necessarily has to return to the given —to intuition— in order to know what the object is.
Reason is synthetic. But, what is the characteristic of this synthesis? It is not only the case of a synthesis we might call psychological, i.e., that I associate my representations, this with that; it is not the case of a subjective synthesis of representations, which would not be of any interest. Also, it is not the case of a mere logical synthesis; that is, it is not the case that objectively considered the content of a concept —this would be a predicate— might be in the concept of the subject. It is the case that the entire order of concepts is referred to something, which is precisely given. In other words, it is the case of an objective synthesis, that what the concepts enunciate is effectively in the given. It is not the case of a psychological synthesis, or a logical synthesis, but of a synthesis that contains or at least tries to contain the truth, i.e., that concepts are in the things that are given.
This truth is the conformity of thought with things. Kant never doubted that this is the truth. How can anyone say that he doubts it when he expressly affirms just the opposite? What happens is that frequently the philosophy of Kant is presented from perspectives completely chimerical and fanciful.
Besides, this truth is a synthetic truth. Therefore, {196} it unifies concepts and reality. What kind of unity is it? That is the question. Leibniz thought it was the case of a unity of the predicate as concept and the subject as concept. For Kant this is not so; it is the unity between an order of concepts and something that has been given, it is a completely different synthesis. Here the question of truth leads to unity, just as in Leibniz; but the way to unity in Kant is going to be completely different from the one in Leibniz. Indeed, if the unity in question is the one we have just indicated, the unity of the concept with what is given, then we have to return to things to find the truth. If it were only this, all our truths, and therefore, the whole synthesis and all the unities would be empirical, would be factual truths. Man would compile a catalog of truths and in the measure they are true they would be properly accomplished in things; they would be unities and truths of fact. But man, the human mind —Kant will tell us— naturally incorporates some truths that are necessary and universal. In other words, that not only there are in fact truths in things effectively given to us, but that for whatever reason —we would have to investigate this— these truths are valid truths for all kinds of possible objects and possible circumstances. This universal and necessarily absolute validity is what Kant calls a priori. Therefore, it means that together with empirical truths that would be unitary syntheses in fact, here we encounter a synthesis, strictly speaking, a priori. This is so, because it is the intrinsic necessity with which certain truths present to us, from the point of view of concepts, something that cannot but be fulfilled in some possible object. The unity of concepts and of things is then an a priori synthetic unity.
{197} Of course, here Kant appeals to what we said above, to the factum of science. Clearly, Kant is not concerned now with the mechanics of Newton as mechanics of Newton, although he may find inspiration in it. He is interested in science not so much for what it has of science in our positive sense of the term, but for what it has of truth. Kant is interested in a theory of truth, of course, as exemplified in science. It is not a theory of scientific knowledge in the style of the positive sciences, but something different; it is a theory of truth as such. Kant tells us, thematically and expressly, that to deny human understanding is capable of incorporating this type of truths would radically amount to skepticism. That is the critique he has directed to the whole philosophy of Hume.
Nevertheless, that these truths may ennunciate something that refers to every possible object as such is what Kant would say is a transcending (Übersteigen), these are transcendental judgments. By “synthetic a priori judgments” he only means, purely and simply, the order of transcendental truth as such. That is what Kant is interested in, that the truth of every possible object is transcendental. Because of this, to ask how the synthetic a priori judgments are possible (in the rough Kantian terminology, very much of his era) is simply to ask how the transcendental order is possible.
As a result, when Kant talks about science (Wissenschaft), he is not referring to the science elaborated starting with the second half of the XVII century, positive science, but rather, he understands by Science a “knowledge” (Wissen) that is in a certain way absolute and radical. In a similar way, years later, when Fichte writes the several editions of his Wissenschaftslehre, this does not mean “theory of science”, something like a methodology of science. On the contrary, the meaning “science” has points to a science of transcendental truth, an absolute science, {198} a transcendental knowledge. This is what the issue is all about. That is the pure and simple formulation of the Kantian problem.
The Kantian problem, following these historical considerations and the logical and critical discussions with Leibniz and Wolff, is reduced to this simple formula, how is the transcendental order possible? A transcendental order directed towards some objects that as such are not identified with things themselves, but however, it is necessary, i.e., it is transcendental. We now have to answer the question, how is this possible? That is precisely the second part of our considerations.
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1 KrV B 72.
2 Metaphysik. Vorlesungen (Kowalewsky), p. 183.
3 KrV A 841, B 869.
4 KrV A 846, B 874.
5 KrV A VII.
6 KrV A VIII
7 KrV B VII, XV, XIX, X
8 [Tr. note: for the Spanish pensabilidad, possibility of being thought]
9 Zubiri note: If I do not distinguish terminologically throughout this exposition between reason and understanding it is due to my desire for simplification. Therefore, as long as I do not indicate to the contrary, let us take them as synonymous.
10 Cf. KrV A 77, B 103.