{273} (cont’d)

C) Third phase: What is the physical reality of the Word, and of Christ? Until now we have ascended, from the affirmation that the Word is God, and that Christ is His real Son, to the truth that the Word is consubstantial to God, and that Christ is physically the Word of God. Let us affirm all these truths in just one as primary: the Word is God, and Christ is the Word “physically”. Then, What does “physically” mean? New possibilities of internal intellection are enlightened by Greek reason in the revealed deposit, and in the dogmatic definitions mentioned above. {274} If physical reality means “substance” (ousía), then the physical divinity of Christ means that in Christ there is only one substance or nature, a kind of annulment of the divine and the human nature. That was the Monophysite interpretation, unisubstantial. From this follows a conception of God himself. If the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are consubstantial, How are they distinguished? Either they are only one entity —this is Modalism— or they are three substantial realities —this is Tritheism. The Trinity would be a triplicity.

However, there is still a different possibility with which to understand physical reality. At that time Greek reason had two concepts at its disposal to conceive the physical reality of man: the concept of persona (Tertullian) or prósopon, and the concept of res, substance or ousía. They express the difference that exists in every man between saying of him “what” he is (including here all the characteristics even the substantial), and saying “who” he is (or I, or you). Both moments are physically real, but are not identical.

1) In the case of Christ, this distinction enlightens one new possibility of understanding His real and physical divine filiation. Christ is Son of God insofar as Word, and the very Word is Son of the Father. Then, if the Son or Word, and the Father are consubstantial (the same ousía), however, they are different insofar as persons. Here we have a new possibility for the internal intellection of the revealed deposit. In that case, the real, and physical filiation of Christ means that the who of Christ is the Word of God, but this does not mean that what Christ is, would be the divine substance of the Word. The Word Incarnated qua person only. Of course, since the person and the substance are not separable, it follows that in Christ the substance of the Word is present, without fusing into a single substance with His own human substance. To the question of what Christ is we must reply that He is two {275} things: God, and son of Mary. But to the question of who is Christ we must reply: he is only the Word, the Son of God qua divine person. It was the definition of the Council of Chalcedon: only the possibility to understand Christ as divine person fulfills —and is consequently true— what the revealed deposit tells us about the filiation of Christ. The other possibility, of understanding this filiation with only the idea of substance, is false.

2) This conception reflects back upon the very conception of the divine Triad. The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are consubstantially God; God as ousía is a monad. But each one of them is person or hypóstasis, as the Cappadocians said (St. Basil, St. Gregory Nazianzen, St. Gregory of Nyssa). As person, God is three. But only as person: the three persons do not differ numerically in their what (the three are the same: only one God), but in their who. Because of this the Triad is not triplicity, but a Trinity: one what in three who’s. Certainly, St. Augustine tells us clearly: “when we are asked what these three are, we have to recognize the extreme poverty of our language. We say three persons in order not to remain silent, not as if we pretended to define the Trinity”¹. One might ask: And why not be silent? Simply because it was not possible, because revelation is intrinsically historical.

Finally, Greek reason enlightened possibilities for a richer internal intellection of the revealed deposit. Christ revealed God being God. The intellection of the divinity of Christ was, at one and the same time, the intellection of the reality of God. This intellection developed in three phases. With respect to Christ {276} the following were defined: a) His real, and not adoptive filiation; b) His real, physical, and not moral filiation; c) His real physical filiation as personal, and not substantial. With respect to God the definitions were: a) that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are God ad intra, and not only ad extra; b) that they are God consubstantially; c) that they are personally different. Christ as Son of God is the very person of the Word insofar as person, but assumes a subsisting integral humanity in the person of the Word.

God is a living God; He was designated as such in the Old Testament, as Yahweh. But now He acquires a concrete figure through the New Testament revelation. He is a living God whose life insofar as personal consists in generation and spiration. These processions concern the persons as such. The three persons of the Trinity are not three persons who are there as three branches from a common trunk. Each person has no reality of its own without reference to the other persons, but is relative to them, as theology points out. I would prefer to say that each person is respective to the others: there is no Father without Son, and no Son without Father, and the Father and the Son cannot but produce the Holy Spirit, etc. Each person is hypostatic, but respective. In other words, there is a oneness among the persons, certainly not numerical (that would deny the Trinitarian dogma), but rather a oneness of respectivity in which the personal life of God consists insofar as personal. Because insofar as merely essential, life is common to the three persons, i.e., it is a personal life in generation and spiration. Each one of these persons confers to the terminus of the procession the integrity of the divinity in a numerical identity. It is like saying that someone in love sees through the eyes of the loved one. Among humans it is metaphor and aspiration. But the infinitude of the essence of God makes this a sheer reality: the Father, {277} the Son, and the Holy Spirit have the same “eyes”. The vision they communicate to each other as different is their I-Father, and I-Son.

The persons find themselves, therefore, in what the Greek called perichóresis, an internal circulation, intimate, of divine life. For Greek theology this perichóresis in the Trinitarian processions produces the consubstantiality of the persons. This is the problem of how three persons consist in only one substance through generation and spiration. For Latin theology, since St. Augustine, consubstantiality is not the result, but the supposition of the processions. There is no doubt that Greek theology remains closer to what is said in the evangelical text. However, outside this theological difference, the dogma has fixed the oneness of the subsistent God in three really different persons. The intellection of the reality of Christ as Son of God has been, at one and the same time, the intellection of what God is as a living God. God made Himself available through an hypostatic Incarnation, but His inaccessible transcendence remains in the mystery of His personal reality².

We would be able to notice that the same thing that occurred with the conception of Christ and God also occurred with theological anthropology, and the sacraments. However, since this is not a course on the history of dogma, please allow me not to enter into this question. After all, what concerns us now is the idea of God throughout Christianity, i.e., Christology and the Trinitarian dogma. Greek reason has enlightened the possibilities for the intellection of Christ and God. But later Christianity is going to find itself in a new situation, when it encounters Modern reason. That is the fourth stage.


{278}

IV. Christianity and Modern reason

Until now, Christianity had been able to elucidate what the revealed deposit is when facing a reason that certainly had not been born in the bosom of the Church, but was not totally alien to it or was —at most— simply alien. Now the encounter is with a new reason, which at least in a global manner, feels not only alien, but in many instances is quite hostile towards revelation. I say in a global manner, because in the expression “Modern reason” different dimensions are involved, which in its own historical reality, as much from the side of reason as from the side of the Church, were not sufficiently discerned, at least in their beginnings.

A) Scientific reason. One form of Modern reason is what we might call the scientific reason, whose novelty proceeds from the distinction between Modern mentality and the ancient one. The lamentable episode of Galileo is the conflict between two mentalities, not a conflict of revelation with science. That would be absurd. The Medieval mentality collided with the Modern mentality and condemned it; but it was not a dogmatic condemnation, it was curial. Scientific reason is not religious, but it is also not irreligious. It is simply non-religious³.

The collision between the mentality of Medieval science with the mentality of Galileo —a painful and brutal collision on the part of non-understanding cardinals— does not affect the essential truth of the problem. In the end, facing scientific truth —even though fragmentary and unilateral, but with some definite things established— Christianity can only take one posture. {279} There is certainly the possibility of dissociating the scientific from the theological conception, and say that while science proceeds in one direction theology proceeds in another. The believer has both options, and the unbeliever only has one. From the point of view of Christianity this is completely false, because of an intrinsic reason, which derives —at least— from the time of St. Athanasius. The second person of the Trinity, the Word, is the subsistent Truth of God, and nothing that is true is alien to the Word⁴. From this stems the principle that must regulate the presence of the Church facing Modern science: the believer not only has the possibility of doing science, i.e., to show that in fact they are not incompatible, but in addition has the strict, and formal obligation of continuing to discover scientific truths, which by the mere fact of being truths are a reflection, and an image of the subsistent Truth of God in the person of the Word.

B) Philosophical reason. Next to scientific reason we have philosophical reason. Although this is less spectacular, it is more serious⁵. Modern philosophical reason is based primarily and formally upon the I⁶: the I is the one who decides, through its {280} own internal reasons, about the whole universe of reality accessible to that I. Because “accessible” means “to be-true”, and what counts as reality is only that, which previously has the characteristic of true. However, truth concerns the very structure of reason. That is why, when inscribing the problem of reality inside the problem of truth, the reality accessible to the I is left pending on the very structure of reason, and founded upon it: the conception of reality depends essentially on the previous conception of reason as such. In the Greek-Latin, and mediaeval world the revealed deposit was confronted in its concrete content with a system of concepts about what reality is, and these concepts enlightened new possibilities of internal intellection of the revealed deposit. But now the revealed deposit is confronted with the very structure of reason. With this, not only the content of the deposit (this or that dogma), but also its formal characteristic of revealed is now debatable. What needs to be intellectually known internally is not only “what” is revealed, but the very fact that it is revealed, the “to be-revealed” as such: this is the problem of “reason-revelation”. Not all “the” Modern philosophy, as it is commonly stated with evident historical ignorance and superficiality, is hostile to revelation. But a great portion of this philosophy undoubtedly rejects, in the name of reason, the whole block of revelation qua revelation. It is, therefore, a new situation, which enlightens new possibilities of intellection concerning revelation as such. These possibilities are highlighted under three concepts of reason in Modern philosophy: {281} empirical reason, rational reason⁷, and historical reason⁸.

1) For a great segment of Modern philosophy, reason cannot exceed the limits of experience: only the empirical is knowable; the trans-empirical is unknowable. Then there exists the possibility of understanding revelation as the irrational correlate of a blind sentiment of faith. Knowledge and faith are separated. The Church rejected this possibility because there is another. Revelation and faith certainly do not address reason only, but they do address reason also, although in a form different from scientific knowledge: they “enlighten” reason although this illumination is not empirical science in the modern sense of the term, it is not something achieved through the way of the empirical as such.

2) However, In what does this enlightenment consist? For another segment of Modern philosophy this enlightenment is the very light of reason, i.e., a rational light: this is the concept of rational reason. Reason reaches the whole of reality, and reaches it rationally. The revealed is then terminus of a rational knowing, and revelation qua revelation is nothing but rational rationality, it is intrinsic rationality. There is an admission of “what is revealed”, but a rejection of its “being revealed”. The Church rejected this possibility of understanding the revealed deposit as mere and supreme rationality. Against any fideism, reason has the naked capacity to reach a knowledge of the existence of God with certainty, but not revelation: revelation is essential mysteriosity. It is not only mysteriosity {282} with respect to the state of reason at one moment in history, but is essential mysteriosity, i.e., with respect to the essential, not merely historical structure of reason. Consequently, there is another possibility of intellectually knowing the enlightenment of faith and revelation, namely, the function of reason in faith and revelation. Without enlightenment by reason neither faith nor revelation would be possible. But this enlightenment consists in the fact that revelation offers reason “signs”, which make it “credible” to reason. Thus, the function of reason does not consist in reaching the truth of a revealed mystery, but in reaching its credibility: reason is the organ for credibility. Even though it is “supra-rational”, revelation is not merely an external dictation. How could it possibly be if not even the revelation of Christ to His most intimate disciples was this way?

Putting together both concepts, the enlightenment of reason, and the credibility of revelation, theology has spoken of reason as a “preamble” to faith. Personally I think that this term is ambiguous, and hides the radical depth of this question. Because preamble can mean the set of truths, which reason can rationally reach before assenting to the revealed mystery. This sense is correct, but it is not the radical one. What is radical is not the truth or truths, which reason may attain to make the revealed mystery acceptable, but the very structure of reason that is capable of “preambulating” faith and revelation; not the preamble, but the “preambularyness” as such of reason. That is what needs to be investigated.

a) Certainly, revelation is only “credible”, and for reason these motives are only motives for credibility. Yet, this does not mean that all motives in turn are rational. There are others, which reason recognizes as motives {283} without they in themselves being rational; for example, affective or moral motives, etc. This already indicates to us that in reason itself we must distinguish what is rationally accessible, and that, which is only reasonably accessible. What is primary is that all motives, rational or not, make revelation reasonable. Only because reason has in itself the dimension of the reasonable it is possible to have “rational” motives for credibility. The credibility is inserted primarily, and formally not in rational reason, but in reasonable reason. And so, this double dimension of reason —the rational and the reasonable— is prior to faith, independent from it; it concerns the essential structure of reason as such, in itself. Rational, and reasonable are essential modes of reason. Reason in itself is always search, and only search; the search for a fundament of the truth of something, which has been apprehended. Reason is going from one reality towards the fundament of its truth. This “questing” (Sp. "qüerente") stepping march can be undertaken through different ways, one of which (but only one) is the “logical” necessity in the widest sense of the term. Therefore, the fundament found in this manner must be confronted with the thing of which it is the presumed fundament, because the real thing is the one that ultimately “gives” us the reason. When that, which has been found by way of logical necessity coincides exactly with the thing, we say that the fundament is rational. When that, which has been found, either by this way of logical necessity or through other different ways, does not coincide exactly with the thing, but converges towards it by congruence, we say the fundament is reasonable. The reasonable is always, and only, the congruent reason with reality. And congruence itself acquires the characteristic of sign or signal for truth in reason. In the great majority of cases, not only {284} in life, but also in science, reason leads only to congruence. The reasonable is the real exceeding reason. Furthermore, depending on the degree of this excess, congruence is greater or lesser, the fundament is more or less reasonable. This uncovers for us two essential moments of reason.

aa) Strictly speaking, reason depends on the fact that the terminus towards which it moves, the real, may or may not give us the reason. In itself, reason is always an open reason, and this aperture is just what confers to reason its characteristic of a way or search. Indeed, this search has a most precise positive characteristic. It is not mere expectation, or mere fortuitousness, because reason, by the fact of being a “questing” (Sp. "qüerente"), sketches from itself (only sketches), in one form or another, the characteristics of that for which it is searching. Reason, from this aspect, is “method”, in almost the etymological sense of the term. Because of this, truth, i.e., the fact that things may give us the reason, is an “encounter” between a reason, which goes towards things by sketching them, and these things that come towards us giving us reason of themselves in a rational or simply reasonable way. Because reason, when it goes towards things, in a certain way forces them to give themselves to us. The oneness of these two movements is the encounter; and in the encounter things give or do not give to us the reason for the sketch. Reason is constitutively, and formally a reason open to an encounter as sketch.

bb) We say that reason is open to an encounter as sketch, as search. Still, reason not only searches, but has to search. Therefore, this second moment —second in the order of exposition, but first by itself— does not come to reason from reason itself. Which means that reason in all its forms is something, which never depends on itself, but depends on something prior to reason, but intrinsic to itself: on intelligence. It is the intelligence itself {285} what forces the search. Consequently, in the end, reason is nothing but the “questing” (Sp. "qüerente") aspect of intelligence. And here is the essence of the matter: What is this intelligence, which intrinsically turns itself into search? In other words, What is this intelligence, which necessarily has to be reason?

________________
¹ De Trinitate, book V, ch. 9, no. 10, in Patrologiae cursus completus, series latina, vol. 42, ed. J.-P. Migne, Paris, 1845, c. 918.
² Here ends the manuscript text, and the transcript of the 1965 Madrid seminar continues.
³ From this point on we follow the text of the 1965 Barcelona seminar.
⁴ According to Athanasius ei de lógo kai sofía kai epistéme sunésteke, kai pantí kósmo diakekósmetai, anágke ton epikeímenon kai diakosmésanta toúton oúk ánlon tiná e Lógon eínai toú Theoú, in his Oratio contra gentes, no. 40, Patrologiae cursus completus, series graeca, vol. 25, ed. J.-P. Migne, Paris, 1857, Chs. 80-81.
⁵ From this point on we follow some typewritten pages by Zubiri himself on the basis of the 1965 Madrid seminar, and destined to be inserted at this point.
⁶ In the 1971 seminar Zubiri remembers his thesis that this idea of reason, differing from the Greek one, is founded upon the idea of creation from nothing. On this topic see the papers of Zubiri “Sobre el problema de la filosofía” [On the problem of philosophy], which appeared in the journal Revista de Occidente, No. 115 (1933), pp. 51-80, and No. 118 (1933), pp. 83-117; and also the article about “Hegel y el problema metafísico” [“Hegel and the metaphysical problem”], included in Naturaleza, Historia, Dios [“Nature, History, God“], 9th ed., Madrid, 1987, pp. 267-287.
⁷ In the 1965 Barcelona seminar Zubiri will say “dialectical reason”.
⁸ Although Zubiri sometimes includes historical reason under philosophical reason, the index, and the numeration he creates for the 1965 Madrid text consider it as a third form of Modern reason together with scientific reason, and philosophical reason.