{297} (cont’d)
cc) What does it find? Deity, let me repeat, is reality as such in its condition of power. It inheres, therefore, in reality {298} as the fundament of that condition of power1. And to this condition of reality is what we call divinity. Two points follow. First, that in contradistinction to deity, which has already been found immediately, divinity is always and only the terminus of a clarifying search by reason. Second, that since deity, regardless of the characteristic of its fundament, resides in reality, it follows that this fundament is necessarily in reality itself; put in simpler terms, divinity necessarily must be somewhere. Therefore, as long as simple divinity is searched for, reason has already found it inexorably, regardless of the way pursued. This must be considered in greater detail.
As I have indicated, in the search for the fundament of deity, reason may undertake one of these three ways: the search for ultimate things, the search for a transcendent reality, the search for the structure of the totality of the cosmos. These three ways are not equivalent; they lead to three radically different types of fundament of deity in reality, i.e., to three radically different types of divinity as an ultimate, possibilitating, and impelling reality. With its sketch for an ultimate divinity, possibilitating, and impelling, reason approaches things, makes the effort to question them through groping; and these things give it their answer, quite different in accordance to the way followed. This is not the place to begin a discussion to decide, which of the three answers is the true one, or which is the adequate way to attain the truth about God. The only thing that concerns us here for this problem is another aspect of the question: to determine with precision the very characteristic of the {299} difference or diversity of the divinity reached by each one of the ways.
At first sight, the difference might seem to consist that one way leads to the real God, while the God the other ways seem to reach is not, i.e., is not God. And since any diversity is inscribed within a common line, it follows that in this interpretation what is common to the three ways, i.e., the divinity, is at best an abstract concept of the divinity. But this is not exact, because the three ways actually reach the real divinity. Let us remember the extreme case of the Lunar god. The polytheist adores the Lunar divinity. But the expression “Lunar divinity” has three aspects: it may signify and at the same time signifies the “god in the Moon”, “god of the Moon”, and “Moon god”. It is true that in practice they may be entangled, or not expressly distinguished. The one who adores the Moon adores this heavenly object while seeing the divinity in it in an undiscerned way, without considering its different aspects. However, from itself (Sp. de suyo), in the Lunar divinity, besides the Moon itself as a heavenly object, the other two aspects are also included undiscernedly. Indeed, in this sense, also the monotheist reaches God in the Moon, because the monotheist God, since He is everywhere is also in the Moon. The same occurs with the one who adores the cosmos in its totality; the Moon is a moment of this totality, is immersed in divinity, and the totality itself is manifested in the Moon; thus, he reaches the divinity in the Moon. Therefore, the three ways reach, not an abstract concept of divinity, but the physical reality of a single divinity. What is common to the three ways is not a mere concept, but a physical reality. Because of this, the three ways are not only opposed to being “disjoined” ways (one God is real, the other two are not), but they converge as “conjoined”. The three physically reach one {300} divinity. Of course, one selfsame divinity, but through different aspects. And here is the margin of irreducibility of the three gods. As long as it is said assertively that the three ways lead to the same divine reality, one is enunciating an unassailable truth. For one way, the error of the other two is not in this assertive moment, but in the affirmation that the other two exclude the idea of God. For the monotheist it is not an error to affirm that God is in the Moon, or is in the entire cosmos, but it would be an error if he were to affirm that God is only in the Moon, or only in the entire cosmos. And in this exclusionary aspect, and only in it, one of the three gods is true, and the other two are not. Assertively, however, the three are true.
With that point clear, we shall continue. The divinity is in reality fundamenting the deity. Consequently, there are only three ways to reach this fundament, i.e., these are the only three possible types of fundament. Therefore, reason inexorably attains the real divinity. Unless one were to say that reason does not find God through any of these three ways at all, that they lead nowhere, or at least, that it is not clear no other unknown ways exist. This is the position of atheism in the first case or agnosticism in the second.
Both coincide in affirming that reason leads nowhere with respect to the divinity2. Nevertheless, this affirmation is nothing but the negative moment of a positive attitude, which we must discover and analyze. Notwithstanding that reason may or may not reach the divinity, the unquestionable fact remains that man configures his own personal being by his turning to reality qua reality, as ultimate, possibilitating, and impelling. Every human being, whether reaching divinity or not is religated to {301} deity, and conversely, actualizes the deity in his religation as fundamentality of his personal being. What the atheist and the agnostic do not find is the fundament of deity. Therefore, that to which they appeal as possibilitating ultimateness and in addition impelling, is purely and simply the dictate of their conscience in each case. This dictate is what constitutes the voice of conscience. The voice is the one that dictates what man must do or not do in each case. This voice is the positive attitude of both the agnostic and the atheist, whose negative moment is the negative appeal to any viable divinity. The ultimate, possibilitating, impelling invocation is the dictate of the voice of conscience. It is in it where the power of deity is actualized, a deity without God or without gods. This is the positive attitude we were interested in discovering. And, as such, it is an essential moment in the conscious elaboration of the being of the human person, notwithstanding his reference to divinity. However, it is necessary we investigate this attitude. It is the philosophical problem of the voice of conscience.
The voice of conscience has two dimensions we must not confuse. On the one hand, the voice of conscience is that which conscience dictates; it is the dictate of what man must do or can do. The formal characteristic of this dictate is expressed in one sole concept: obligation. By this I do not mean that everything conscience dictates may be obligatory; often they are mere possibilities, but possibilities of realizing what I am going to be, and must be, i.e., they are inscribed in a fundamental obligation. Still, in the voice of conscience there is a different dimension. There is not only that which is dictated by conscience, but the dictation itself as such. And this no longer has the characteristic of obligation. That I may have to follow the dictate of my conscience is not an obligation, but a compulsion. I can certainly reverse it, but in this case the compulsion of the voice of {302} conscience is expressed in what is positive about the reversion. And this is what is essential about the voice of conscience: not what it dictates, but the dictation itself. Putting it in other words: given that what conscience dictates is an obligation, something intentional, the compulsion of the dictate itself is not intentional, but physical.
To think that the “relation” of someone to his own conscience is in turn an obligation —the first obligation, if you will— is to fall into the same error as when one says that intelligence not only knows, but knows itself, and therefore, that the relationship of conscience with itself is self-knowledge. That is absolutely impossible. It is true there is self-knowledge, but because there is an autós capable of re-acting (Sp. reobrar) on itself. And this capacity is prior to the knowledge it finds in that turning upon itself. That is what reflexivity is. Reflexive knowledge presupposes the reflexivity of conscience. And this reflexivity is pre-cognitive. It is a physical moment of the reality we call intelligence. Therefore, having to follow the voice of conscience is not in turn a dictate of conscience, but something prior to this dictate. It is a physical moment of conscience. The “relationship” of man to his conscience is not one more obligation, but a voice, and therefore, something physical: it is a force. Something as sui generis as anyone may propose, but a force nevertheless. Only because man has a voice of conscience that dictates can there be an obligation towards oneself. The philosophical problem of the voice of conscience centers on the physical dimension of a voice that dictates, i.e., on the dictate as such. What is this voice?
As a voice, it is above all a voice that dictates to me. I shall call it a “voice-to”. It is a physical moment, which forces me —as I said above, in its sui generis way. Now we can say with greater precision: it is the physical moment we call {303} power. The physical power of the “voice-to” is precisely that to which the agnostic and the atheist appeal. And not what it dictates, but that it is dictating to me is what constitutes the ultimate power, possibilitating, and impelling. Because of that, it keeps us religated. Religation essentially has that dimension as a “voice-to” me from conscience (although it may not exhaust itself in it, which is an entirely different matter). Because of that the agnostic and the atheist are religated to an ultimate power, possibilitating and impelling, which is the voce that dictates to me in my conscience. This voice is, therefore, a moment of the deity, and every man is religated to it, regardless of the fact that he may or may not be an atheist or an agnostic.
Yet, the voice of conscience has a second aspect: it is not only a voice dictating to oneself, but a voice that dictates from the very conscience; this is the source of its singular strength and power. Now it is not only “voice-to”, but also “voice-from”. This is the accurate aim of the expression: the voice of conscience3. As I have said, the voice, the audition, is a strict intellection: an auditive intellection. Indeed, the voice of conscience is an auditive intellection. The power with which the voice of conscience makes me abide by reality —and which expresses the restlessness for the absolute being to which I am referring in my attitudes— is immediately present in the voice of conscience. It will be sufficient to analyze any moment and phenomenon in which the voice of conscience is involved in a thematic way and —if you will— somewhat loudly and clear in me, to understand that in this abiding by reality, the power of reality is actualized in an immediate way. Yes, but the real thing itself remains hidden behind the power of reality. And this thing suffers the same fate as the sonorous object: the thing that has a sound is not the {304} sound, but that, which sounds, it is the “fundament” of the sound. In this case it is a question of the hidden reality behind the auditive intellection, which constitutes the voice of conscience, and presents to me the power of the real. The voice of conscience is, in this sense, the sonorous palpitation of the power of the real in me. And this sonorous palpitation physically remits to that same reality, as its fundament. It might then be said that, in the best of cases, if it remits to a reality it would be mine, but not the one belonging to other things. Here is precisely where the error resides. Because insofar as real, I am not any different than the other things4. That to which I am made to abide by the voice of conscience and the power of the real is the real qua real. And, therefore, regardless of the kind of things among which man finds himself, which he contacts and encounters, that in which he is, is in reality. That applies equally to this reality I am. Certainly, it is the voice of “my” conscience, but what it dictates to me is to abide by reality, whichever it may be. Consequently, that voice of conscience, though emergent from “my” substantive reality, and though dictating to me to abide by reality, is a dictate of reality qua reality. Indeed, in it all other things are incorporated. There is no difference at all between a human way and a metaphysical way in the voice of conscience and in its remittance to the fundament.
Because of this, the voice of conscience is not a mere moral phenomenon, but is the voice of reality that remits to its fundament, and palpitates sonorously in the depth of this reality I am, of my absolute reality. Religated to ultimate reality, possibilitating, and impelling, its power {305} makes us absolute, makes us radically restless, and calls us in the voice of conscience, by which every act down to the smallest, is remitted physically to the real fundament of that power. [Anyone who locks himself within the dictate of his own conscience not only locks himself with what his conscience tells him, but also with the very saying of his conscience, with the dictate. In the dictate, actually, the divinity, which constitutes the root of that dictate, is palpitating. Atheism is a confinement of conscience in the palpitation of God in the depth of the spirit. In its own way it reaches God.]5
Finally, the preambulary characteristic of reason consists in being an open reason. From the point of view of reason, it is an inconceivable tyranny to believe that it simply consists in understanding what we have in front of us. Reason and intelligence, even in their most modest strata, besides this presentative dimension, do have a directive dimension, they have a “towards”. In that case truth does not consist exclusively in a conformity with what reason understands presentatively, but rather, if we follow the way of this “towards”, we reach a point where actually, reality, through this way, realizes by elevation what inside this way has lead us to the point. This is the idea of open reason.
C) Historical reason. All of the above is not quite final. The Church, primarily in the XIX cent. has an encounter with a third dimension of reason: historical reason. Now the Church finds herself in the necessity of dealing not just with this or that dogma, but with the totality of her own historical development. And that is a radically important question. Because up to this point {306} the Church had limited herself to unfolding revelation throughout the whole of history. But a moment is reached when it is inexorable that she becomes aware of herself, and asks, In what does this development consist? That was the problem of the evolution of dogma6. It is a new vision of Biblical exegesis and theology. Facing this problem new possibilities appear.
1) One possibility —the most elemental, the first one that comes to mind and the one most false— is to think that revelation is an “impulse”. An impulse that, although it has had its beginning in Abraham, for that, which concerns Christianity it has begun with Christ. It is similar to a great wave, which continues to propagate throughout history. Throughout its length it continues to receive different forms, and different conceptualizations. All of them are, actually, extrinsic to its impulse. These are the symbols in which she expresses herself, and by which she maintains herself. But the only thing that really matters is this impulse that, although transforming itself through many formulations not affecting the intrinsic truth, preserves itself purely and simply as an impulse stemming from Christ. This external symbolism was defended at the beginning of the century by what was called, with the probably unfortunate name of modernism. Indeed, the Church rejected this point of view as impossible from inside the essence of what Christianity is. Because revelation is not an “impulse”, but a “deposit” of truth. Containing any amount of the historic, but a deposit of truth nevertheless.
2) This created the necessity of putting in motion a second possibility: to interpret the history of revelation as a “declaration” of the deposit. Dogma is, actually, the {307} “definition” of the deposit. This problem had not been alien to the theologians now for several centuries. Rightly so, for there is a historical distinction between revelation and a dogma. A dogma is a truth not formally enunciated in revelation. Obviously, there are numerous formally enunciated truths in revelation. But there are others, which are not formally enunciated in revelation, which the labor of the Church in understanding it (for the moment let us say it simply this way) has been defining as truths, afterwards. And this is what in all propriety is called dogma. In this sense, not all the reality of revelation is dogma: it is more than a dogma. For example, the naked fact that Christ is the Son of God is not the object of a dogma; it is formally in the deposit of revelation. What will be the object of a dogma is to affirm, for example, in what His filiation consists, or to affirm that Christ is God in the sense of an eternal and personal Word, or that He is God insofar as Incarnate Word, etc. Therefore, there is a formal difference between what the simple revealed deposit is, and a dogmatic definition. Thus, a dogmatic definition is not simply the declaration of a truth. It is something more. A dogmatic definition is the declaration of a truth, which is defined as already contained in the revealed deposit. That is the important question. Because regardless of the reasons or the motives, which lead the human spirit (including the collective spirit of the Church or the individual spirit of the Pontiff 7) to that definition, those reasons never form a part —unless the contrary is expressly stated— of the dogmatic definition. The dogmatic definition is not in the consideranda, but in the sentence. All the rest is very important, it may have great authority, but is not {308} what formally constitutes the dogma. The dogma enunciates the truth of a proposition as contained in the revealed deposit. To do this the Church calls upon the infallible assistance of the Holy Spirit.
However, this is not an obstacle for theology wishing to ask, in the first place, how these truths were pre-contained in the revealed deposit. Furthermore, although the reasons may not form part of the dogma, without them there would not have been a way to reach the definition. Then, a second question has to be asked, about how these truths were extracted from the revealed deposit7. These two questions are essentially connected. Because depending on the reply as to how they are extracted, the idea about how they were pre-included in the first place is going to be greatly influenced.
Theologians in general have pondered primarily and above all on what they call the theological conclusion, deduced from the premises of a reasoning process. Both can be dogmatic, which will then result in a third dogma, as a consequence of the previous ones. But it may happen —and this is the most difficult part of the problem— that the major premise is already a revealed dogma or is formally in the deposit of revelation, and the second premise is a truth from natural reason or philosophy. What is the value of the conclusion then? Many theologians (I prescind now from all the great differences that exist in the conceptualization of what a theological conclusion is) {309} agree that the theological conclusion, as a conclusion, leads to a definable truth.
Of course, not all dogmas, at least apparently, are in this situation. First, because there are theological conclusions, which can have an enormous weight, without being dogmas of faith. For example, that Christ while on Earth had a Beatific Vision. It may seem strange that no one denies this; but it is not a truth of faith, it is not a dogma of the Church. However, there are other dogmas, which are dogmas just as much as the very divinity of Christ, and as a theological conclusion are somewhat or completely fragile. For example, the Immaculate Conception. It serves no purpose to wield the argument of Duns Scotus: potuit, decuit, ergo fecit. Of course, the difficulty resides in the second premise: “it was convenient to do it”. Here is where the theologians disagreed. Not even considering the fact that it is not true that Scotus formulated his defense of the Immaculate Conception through this reasoning8, the Immaculate Conception is something completely incidental and marginal in his theology. After the dogmatic definition it has received an aura that Scotus himself never gave to it. Scotus believed, like so many others, in the Immaculate Conception simply through piety for the Holy Virgin Mary, and the performance of his religious life. Not all dogmatic truths are, at least strictly, conclusions. It is certain that after being defined a dogma can be given the form of a conclusion. But they are always a posteriori arrangements.
Nevertheless, there are two ways that no theologian would reject out of hand, regardless of the form he chooses to articulates them: the way of conclusion, and the way of religious living. On the one hand, the dogmatic truth as a conclusion. And, on the {310} other, as a discovery of some truths in revelation through sensibility, through internal religious living, through the spiritual life. However, these two solutions in one form or another benefit from the solution given to the issue of how dogmas are contained in revelation. On the one hand, every conclusion is implicitly contained in the premises. And if it were because of religious living, this life would illuminate what is implicitly contained in revelation. In this case the dogma would also be pre-contained in the deposit of revelation as the explicit is contained in the implicit. It is an initial implicitness. Certainly, one cannot avoid making a few observations about this conception.
a) In the first place, here we have two ways of reaching a dogma. They may be articulated in one form or another, but it is difficult to deny a real autonomy either to theological conclusions, which lead to the condemnations of Arius or Nestorius, or to the dogma of the Immaculate Conception, or the recently defined dogma of the Assumption of Mary. These are two different ways resting on implicitness. But then, are they really two different ways? Why? Are there any others?
b) In the second place we are told that the dogma defined this way is implicitly contained in the deposit of revelation. Yes, but here we have another equivocation, subtle, but with some importance. Because to be implicit is not the same as being implicated. Everything implicated is not implicit in the sense of a conclusion.
c) Even more, since that which is implicated is not only the set of some defined dogmatic propositions, but something different. Let us not forget that from its very origin revelation is a sóma, a body, where consequently implication does not only mean {311) that some dogmas combined with others lead to a third, but that the formulation, the doubt, or the obscurity about a point has repercussions upon the integrity of the whole body of revelation. This is true, regardless of the type of dogmas proposed. It goes without saying what it could do to the Trinitarian dogma: What would happen to the ultimate sense of the life of grace, and the possession of eternal life if Christ, for example, were only an adoptive Son of God, or if the Holy Spirit were not God? Even in dogmas, which apparently do not enunciate anything but facts, the repercussion is immediate. Take the case of the Immaculate Conception. Certainly, as a privilege of Mary it can be of great usefulness to all of us. Without doubt the dogma enunciates a personal privilege of the Virgin Mary. However, it also involves a conception of eschatology, i.e., it reinforces down to its ultimate consequences the idea of original sin, what it is, and what the exemption from original sin means. With it the entire body of revelation vibrates. Analogously with the Assumption of Mary. It is a personal privilege. But this personal privilege precisely clarifies an eschatological dimension inhering in revelation as such: the difference between death and corruption. It is not of faith that the Blessed Mother has not died. What was defined is that she suffered no corruption. Evidently, where dogmas are implicated is not just on their relation to each other, but to the entire body of revelation, to its characteristic of sóma.
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1 Originally the phrase, corrected by Zubiri’s hand, said: “Inheres, therefore, in reality, but in its condition of power”.
2 Here ends the typewritten text by Zubiri, and is followed by two manuscript pages.
3 Zubiri refers to the 1968 seminar, where he has undertaken the problem of the voice of conscience. From this point on we follow part of that exposition.
4 Zubiri notes at the margin: ““careful with this” (Sp. “ojo”) [Tr. note: literally “eye”, idiomatic expression meaning “watch this carefully”].
5 The text in square brackets comes from the 1965 Barcelona seminar. From here on the typewritten transcription continues, corrected by Zubiri, of the 1965 Madrid seminar.
6 A Zubiri work on the problem of the evolution of dogma, dating from 1967, and the study of this problem during the 1971 seminar will be published in a future book about Christianity [Tr. note: This book was published in 1997 under the title El problema teologal del hombre: Cristianismo (“The Theological Problem of Man: Christianity”). It is the third one of the trilogy about God].
7 Zubiri writes a question mark on the margin.
8 On a file card Zubiri writes:
“The dogmas:
1st. How were they contained
a) As conclusion
b) As living organism (Newman)
2nd. How are they extracted
a) Through reasoning
b) Through religious sensibility”
8 Zubiri notes at the margin: “it was Eadmer”.