{311} (cont’d)

3) These observations do not invalidate the work of theologians in reaching for conclusions. They do invite to make —at least modestly— some reflections to pay stricter attention to what the history of revelation is. The history of dogmas is, from the point of view of the history of some truths, something that is inscribed in what truth {312} really is when it is being discovered by men regardless of the order with which it is accomplished. Truth can be conceived as a conformity of thought with things. There is no doubt about that. But what is also true is that man does not discover those propositions, in conformity with reality, simply by just looking with our eyes. The real object that man faces, in addition to the real properties it possesses, offers some possibilities founded on it. Offered not only for truth, but in general for the whole structure of man. For example —this is a problem of Physics— the air has a certain number of properties such as density, weight, volume, etc. But man adumbrates a possibility, such as the possibility of utilizing air as a means of travel. This is something different. Possibilities are not formally properties of air. One possibility —for example, building airplanes— does not necessarily add or discover a new property of reality. However, it is quite clear that without certain real properties these possibilities would never exist. Yet, among the possibilities that reality envisages for man, there are some, which do not refer exclusively to what man is going to do with things, but have reference to an internal intellection of the very reality man has in front of him: they are possibilities directed to its internal intellection. And these possibilities do not lead to a utilization of reality as in the case of other possibilities (which we might call external possibilities), but lead to a further intellection, and a deeper one, of reality itself. These possibilities are adumbrated from —and in— a perfectly delineated mental situation. For example, in the XV cent. there were two possibilities to understand nature: one as an organism, the other as a mechanism. Galileo opted for the second, and created Mathematical Physics.

{313} Possibilities are envisaged from a perfectly concrete situation. And in this situation from the side of the intellect, the different possibilities are inchoatively directed by reality itself. And, while taking each as a way to reach the interior of reality, they present themselves to us as internal possibilities of intellection. Of these possibilities, some are fulfilled in the real object; others are not. And the fulfillment of one of these possibilities in the real object is precisely what we call the truth of this possibility. Reality, therefore, is not only that, which formally and expressly is present in front of our eyes, but also that, which in an inchoative way directs us towards the interior of things, to the place where this inchoative possibility finds its exact fulfillment. The truth of a possibility is its fulfillment. Consequently, the way to reach a discernment of the fulfillment of a possibility in a reality can be quite varied. Of course, it can be through a reasoning. The Poisson equation can be applied to calculate the distribution of gravitation in a continuous mass. There is no doubt in this; it is mathematical reasoning. But also it cannot be denied that this is a “possibility” (perhaps one in many) to understand the internal reality of a fluid. It follows that there might be a different way: the return to a new inspection of reality; not to perform a new reasoning, but to pay attention to it, for example, in the form of a new experiment. Be that as it may, in both cases the truth of the possibility resides precisely in its fulfillment in reality.

Indeed, in the case of a conclusion —including the most strict and rigorous sense of the term— this dimension of possibility is present. The most logical conclusion in the world (A is B, B is C, therefore A is C) has two aspects. {314} One, the logical rigor of a conclusion. From this aspect the conclusion still has purely and simply the logical rigor, which it derives from the premises. There is no doubt at all of this, and, therefore, only logic —in the formal or real sense of the term— has the last word in order to know if that is true or not. Here truth is “conformity”. Quite so, but nothing prevents that the enunciation of the premises may have been more or less accepted as a possibility to understand reality from the point of view of man. And, in such case, the same conclusion is presented to us not only as a rigorous and logical conclusion from some premises, but as the fulfillment of a possibility. Truth is “fulfillment”. If under the first aspect this reasoning is a logical conclusion, under the second aspect it is an event in the strict sense I give to this term. In other words, it is purely and simply the true fulfillment of a possibility. In that case truth is something intrinsically historical. Therefore, the same truth is at the same time the one and the other. Yet, that by which it is historical is not that by which it is logical. They are two different dimensions of the same conclusion. Logic is not opposed to history and neither is history to logic. That by which the conclusion is rigorously logic is not the same than that by which it is an event in the strict sense I have just defined.

This new reality is certainly in reality. Yes, but how? Certainly not as an implicit property in other properties (it might be the case, but it is not necessarily so), it is rather the case of possibilities founded in reality, in order to know them intellectually. Possibility is not in things implicitly, as an implicit property among others, but as a possibility. For example, the capacity to be a means of transportation is in the {315} physical reality of that to which it is a possibility. It is there foundationally or fundamentally, in the sense of fundament. Man, in his diverse historical situations, keeps illuminating and obturating different internal possibilities for the intellection of reality. There is no doubt that, for example, the mathematical Physics of Galileo has illuminated fabulous possibilities for the intellection of reality. But, Who is actually sure that the predominance of the mathematical vision of the universe has not left behind in the dark other dimensions, which nature offers to us? We shall never know it, or at least we shall need a lot of time before we know it. Before the illumination, truths were there undiscernedly, which does not mean they were there confusedly. The fact is that the question had not been posed yet, and, therefore, the possibilities had not appeared to the human mind. This is the essential point. The history of truth is a stepping march towards the deeper reality of the object.

Having clarified the basic issue, let us now deal with dogma.

a) In a first stage we have the integral revealed deposit. It has some expressed truths, and in addition some inchoated truths in the form I have just described.

b) Facing this inchoateness in a perfectly concrete situation, man is enlightened by certain possibilities. Nevertheless, this situation is an integral situation, the integral religious situation of man. It does not exclude reasoning or intelligence, but there is no reason why it should be limited to them. In addition there are the many other dimensions of the religious situation, like piety, morality, etc. What defines the oneness of the situation in which man illuminates his possibilities facing the deposit of revelation is precisely the integral religious situation. Not even the most intransigent religious heretic, such as Arius and Nestorius were, would have refused {316} to say that his situation was religious. Even the theological conclusion is not a speculation, which operates in a vacuum, but is illuminated in and from an integral religious situation.

c) Among these possibilities one is the true one. The others are not true. The one that is true is precisely the one that is fulfilled, and is the terminus of a dogmatic definition.

Therefore, dogma is fundamentally located in the revealed deposit. Dogma does not depend at all on the reasons, which may have led to its discovery as a definable truth. Even the consideranda, which may appear in a definitory Bull or in a conciliar Decree with respect to interpretations of passages in the Sacred Scriptures, etc., unless they are expressly defined, do not constitute part of the definition. It is also possible that errors may be involved. The dogmatic affirmation is the affirmation —through the infallible assistance of the Holy Spirit— for the fulfillment of a possibility in the revealed deposit. The truth of dogma is located fundamentally in the revealed deposit. It follows that dogma, which a parte rei is fundamentally in the revealed deposit, from the side of the human intellect —inscribed in a religious situation—, is only there inchoatively. It is not the case that it is there confusedly. It is not even the case that it is there implicitly, because this would affect the content of the revealed deposit. It means purely and simply that it is there fundamentally in the sense of a “foundationality”. The definition defines the fulfillment of a possibility of intellection in the revealed deposit. The dogma is foundationally and foundedly located in the revealed deposit. And precisely because each dogmatic definition is the fulfillment of a possibility, revelation, in its dogmatic definitions, is intrinsically and formally historical. Dogma is located {317} in the inchoative and historical fundamentality of revelation.

The value of the dogmatic definition and fountain of its truth resides on the infallible assistance of the Holy Spirit. One may think that this infallible assistance is something external that floats, so to speak, above the vicissitudes of history. How could we possibly admit this? It is just the opposite. What the infallible ecclesiastical illumination does is precisely to realize by the very organ of the Church the intrinsic historicity of revelation. It is not a light extrinsically added to it. Infallibility is the órganon of the intrinsic historicity of revelation. It is not something meta-historical. Dogma, through an assistance of the Holy Spirit (leaving aside the question whether this assistance is merely negative or involves a special illumination —even though it may not be a revealing one— for the act of definition), defines in this intrinsic manner, which is not extrinsic to history. Dogma is the expression of the intrinsic historicity of revelation.

Consequently, in the first place, it is not true that there is an evolution of dogma, if by evolution we understand a transformation. That would be the modernist thesis, which is totally unacceptable. In the second place, strictly speaking, there is no development of dogma. “Development” is a biological concept, by virtue of which it is thought that the history of revelation is like a germ that undergoes development. An appeal was made —although that had not been the intention of Christ— to the evangelical parable of the mustard seed, reinforced with the idea of yeast, which ferments bread. Of course, all this concerned the properties, i.e., the material content of the revealed deposit. However, I believe that this is not the case at all. The situation points to the fact that dogmatic truths are fundamentally located in the revealed deposit, and are {318} defined as possibilities, which are fulfilled in it. Therefore, there is no evolution, no development of dogma, but purely and simply, history of dogma. History of revelation.

The history of dogma, therefore, depends on a divine will —positive and formal— for an intrinsically historical revelation. The revealed deposit not only has a history in the sense of vicissitudes, but is intrinsically historical. History is revelation in act. This expression not only means that in each moment of history there is the presence of what is actually revealed and proposed to the faith of the faithful. It also means that a parte Dei God himself has made His revelation in a historical way. The act of revelation is intrinsically, formally, and theologically historical. It must have history because of the way God himself has wished to make the revelation. The Church cannot safely maintain the revealed deposit except by declaring herself, i.e., illuminating and elucidating what are the possibilities that are fulfilled. That is the history of dogma, the history of the possibilities of revelation, which gather a greater enlightenment throughout history. To clarify this we must point out three essential things.

a) No dogma is established in solidarity to the situation, which has illuminated the concepts formulated in it. Every dogma, once defined, is not only true for all time, but also for everyone. Consequently the Church, when defining a dogma, never establishes a solidarity with the philosophical sense of the words employed, even though these words may proceed from a particular philosophy. That would be completely chimerical. The Church utilizes these terms purely and simply in a common sense. When she has referred to the difference between nature and person —leaving aside the metaphysical speculation about the difference between substance and subsistence— the Church {319} has appealed purely and simply to something that without these discussions would not have been clarified, but belongs to common usage: the difference between the what, and the who. What Christ is, God and man. But then, Who is Christ? The Incarnate Word, identically. The same occurs with the Trinity. And the same occurs with any other dogma. Even the famous Council of Vienne, which said that the soul is the substantial form of the human body, did not have the least intention to dogmatically define Aristotelian hylomorphism. What it wished to define was, against those who admitted three souls, that there is only one soul¹. Since it was usually admitted then that the soul was the substantial form of the body, the definition of the Council of Vienne (1311-1312) defended the oneness of the human spirit, but it never referred to the hylomorphic characteristic with which it informs a body.

b) In the second place, if no dogma is in solidarity with certain particular philosophical concepts, then we will ask, In what does simple faith consist? This expression “simple faith” is equivocal. It is equivocal because there can be no denying that throughout history further truths about revelation have been illuminated. What has not been increasing is the content of revelation. That is absolutely certain. Therefore, this expression “simple faith” may have an assertive sense: actually one believes just what the Creed says and no more. This is a strict and rigorous faith, of course. Nevertheless, if someone were to tell me: I believe this, and in addition I formally exclude everything the Church may say or has said with respect to the dogmas, clearly that man would place himself outside the Church. Simple faith is a purely assertive faith, and not {320} exclusive. And in this assertive form, from the Gospels to the Cappadocian Fathers, and to the Councils of Ephesus and Chalcedon, divine filiation was admitted, the characteristic of Son of God. However, that this characteristic is regarded as a person, and that this person is in Trinitarian circumincession with others, is a dogma that, unless it is formally excluded from simple faith, does not invalidate it.

c) In the third place, the history of dogma is radically incomplete. First, How can we pretend that the enunciated dogmas are absolutely adequate to what they wish to define? No dogma enjoys this privilege. Even in the case of dogmas so elementary as the definition that there are only seven sacraments. The definition seems to be quite adequate. But one may ask, What does it mean that they are seven? Does it mean they are different signs and each one efficiently produces its own specific grace? That is quite true. But then, Does this mean that the mode of producing grace by each one of these symbols is incompatible with those of the other sacraments, and does not produce the grace of other sacraments? That would be false theologically. Any sacrament can produce per accidens —as a theologian says— the grace of other sacraments². Even in this very simple case it is not so easy to find the moment of adequation. And, second, because with or without adequation, How can we say that the possibilities for an internal intellection of the revealed deposit are exhausted? That would be absurd. To appreciate this let us recall the last dogmatic constitution of Vatican II, with reference to {321} episcopal collegiality. That it is in conformity with reality, is clearly unquestionable. Nevertheless, Does it adequately and exhaustively express everything that episcopal collegiality is? No bishop would admit it.

This stage, therefore, has been the encounter of Christianity with modern reason in its scientific, philosophical, and historical forms³. Indeed, confronting this world there were two distinct possibilities. One, the attitude of defending itself. Unfortunately, it has been the attitude, which for centuries Christianity and the Church have taken. By virtue of this attitude, the development of the modern world has been accomplished completely outside the doors of the Church. The other possibility was different, to have done again with modern reason precisely what previously had been done with Greek reason, to have used it internally and intimately, in order to develop with it new and different possibilities for Christianity. These possibilities, in turn, may open different ways. On one hand, for example, opening the way of salvation, to consider Christianity as a religion of salvation. But next to this there are other different and possible ways, which are not indeed the way of salvation.

Be that as it may, if we now consider not only scientific and philosophical reason, but in addition historical reason, then the universality of Christianity appears with a different characteristic than the one it had within mediaeval theology. Mediaeval theology understood by universality that all men, by the mere fact they are members of the human species, are called to Christ. On the other hand, here it is a matter of something different, of a perfectly historical oneness. All men, in their internal historical unity, in {322} their historical activities, and in their historical connections, develop a universality, and that universality is precisely the one about which St. Paul talks to us (cf. Rom 1:1-3, 21; 5:12-21; Eph 2:11-22).


V. Christianity and religions

Now a fifth stage is entered, the present one. In it Christianity has to deal not only with modern reason, but with something different: with modern history, i.e., with other peoples and other mentalities. Until now theology had moved evenly within the ambit of the concepts, which Greek thought had provided to it, definitely within the ambit of European thought. But then, what about the other types of thought? What about other peoples with other mentalities, and different religions?

Needless to say that facing different mentalities Christianity can adopt different attitudes. On the one hand, it has been able to consider that other mentalities are not adequate for a real and exact apprehension of what Christianity pretends. Of course, no one has put it just like that, but de facto it has been practiced by almost everyone. This aura of a strange and alien religion, which Christianity has when it has been preached in Asia, Is there any doubt that it comes from this attitude? The other possibility is precisely the opposite: to consider that everything to which historical Christianity has been most attached and connected, i.e., Greek reason and the whole of speculative theology, is nothing but a mentality like any other. It is nowhere indicated that different mentalities belonging to other peoples may not be at some time the adequate órganon {323} to discover and actualize new aspects of revelation, completely inadverted by Greek reason, by European reason.

Just as an example of this, we may point to the fact that Greek reason in European theology has had to speculate enormously concerning the idea in what the divinity of Christ consists, as a complete exception within humanity. For a Brahman the problem is entirely the opposite. For them this is something commonplace. Brahmanic pantheism, which is not a European style pantheism, consists precisely in the idea that everything has a divine subsistence. For Catholic theology, that God could have become Incarnate in the entire creation, and in addition not only one person, but the three, has not been anything more than a kind of dialectical occurrence. However, it is a living situation for Brahmanic thought. The idea of Incarnation would appear quite differently, when assimilated by Indian mentality, than the way it has been assimilated by European mentality. This is so because a finished revelation does not mean an exhausted revelation. Unfortunately, the routine of European thought has lead men to believe that revelation is not only finished, but in addition finished in the way it has occurred in time. But that will depend on the will of God, and certainly that is not what He wishes.

Furthermore, Christianity not only has to face other mentalities, which will eventually impress a different history to the idea of the Christian God —definitely within the finished revelation—, but in addition has to face the entire body of the religions of other peoples. It is interesting to note here that the first critical history of religious ideas has come {324} from Islam, from ’Ibn Hazm of Córdoba⁴ (994-1064). At any rate, the situation of facing other religions, insofar as non-Christian religions, has to be taken up by Christianity from its own point of view⁵. Now Christianity faces a problem, which is not similar to the ones it has been facing in the past (such as conceptual thinking, a meditation on its own history, the history of dogma and revelation, etc.), but in some respects a more basic problem. What is Christianity from the point of view of the history of religions, and what is the phenomenon of religious history? It is an examination of conscience, not through what affects the history of Christian revelation, but through what affects the theology of history insofar as it is a history in which God manifests Himself. This is the Christian theology —just starting and learning to talk— of the history of religions.


* * * * * * * * * * * * * *


Finally, the history of Christianity, as history of the Church, is not a history of revelation, but precisely the revelation itself in act. Because of this it is constituted with an intrinsic historicity. In other words, history is not only the vehicle of revelation, but is also the very actuality of revelation in all its manifestations. In the first place, from the point of view of its revealed moment, each moment incorporates the previous one. Our profession of faith incorporates what the preaching of Christ and the Apostles was. And that preaching incorporates the whole development {325} of the religious idea in the Old Testament, in the whole of Israel. In the second place, as revelation it brings to history the very actuality of God, to be able to communicate with God really and truly. In the third place, it opens up the horizon towards the consummation of time.

In addition, this revelation as act has two aspects. On the one hand, undeniably, it possesses the characteristic of act, like any other historical act. An act in which actually new forms are being discovered by virtue of more or less complicated procedures and processes. But for the believer there is a second aspect, because this act, as a purely historical reality, is precisely revelation in act, i.e., a manifestation of something that in a historical and real way, lies beneath the merely historical concatenation. In other words, this is the way of historical transcendence to access God, to the strict revelation. The oneness of these two dimensions of the act is precisely what constitutes the mystery of history. And the mystery as act in the first sense (as historical occurrence in act, but an act purely internal to history), is strictly the sign of the act in the second sense. A sign of what occurs in the depth of it, namely, the revelation of Revelation in an intrinsic historicity.

Consequently this sign of history incorporates the past, actualizes revelation, and opens towards the future. It is, in a radical and strict sense, a sacramentum. This is precisely what every sacrament has. Therefore, for Christianity, the mystery of its own history is purely and simply revelation in act, i.e., historical time as sacrament of eternity.

________________
¹ It concerns the condemnation of some theses by Franciscan theologian Petrus Johannis Olivi (+1298), according to whom the spiritual soul could not immediately be united to the body, but needed a prior sensitive and vegetative soul.
² Zubiri refers to A. Tanquerey, Synopsis theologiæ dogmaticæ, t. III: De Deo sanctificante et remunaratore seu de Gratia, de sacramentis, et de novissimis, Roma, 1919 (16th ed.), pp. 220-221.
³ From this point on, we follow the 1971 seminar.
⁴ Cf. his work Kitab al-fasl fi ’l-milal wa’l-ahwa wa’l-nihal, translated into Spanish by M. Asín Palacios, Abenházam de Córdoba y su historia crítica de las ideas religiosas (’Ibn Hazm of Córdoba and his critical history of religious ideas), 5 vols., Madrid, 1927-1932.
⁵ From this point on we follow the text of the 1965 Madrid seminar.