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INTRODUCTION

THE THEOLOGICAL LOGOS

The title of these pages immediately suggests the idea of a dialog between man and Christianity¹. Since it is presupposed that the dialog is based on our present situation, the attempt to carry it forward must begin by sharpening the actual terms of the dialog. Only then we shall be able to discern the outline of the way to handle it. This shall also determine the type of its development. The beginning of our enterprise, therefore, consists in clarifying two points from the outset.

§ 1. The terms of the dialog: present day man and Christianity.
§ 2. The character of the dialog: the theological problem.


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§ 1

THE TERMS OF THE DIALOG:
PRESENT DAY MAN AND CHRISTIANITY

Clearly, as I was saying, it is a case of the situation of present day man, a situation that Christianity has to confront with whatever constitutes its own essential reason for being. Since a dialog is only possible if it starts from a single point, if not of coincidence at least of convergence, it will be necessary to clarify in broad strokes what our situation is, what the formal essence of Christianity is, and where that point is located for the possible convergence or coincidence between the two terms. It is not as obvious as it may appear at first sight. Present day man, we are told, is immersed in technology, in an incredibly powerful technology that seems to place no limits to the domination of nature by man. Instead of being a mere outcropping of nature, present day man increasingly has the impression of having appropriated it, of being its lord and master.

To this trait we could add many others. For example, anthropology (in the widest sense of the term) is discovering not only the origins of man, but also the strata and the most profound tendencies of his being. Human conviviality, on the other hand, is acquiring characteristics, not only more just and equitable, but from mere coexistence it is transforming itself into radical conviviality. The description could and should be enlarged further. Fundamentally, it consists in a complete change of the position of man in the universe, and in the so-called structures of life, both individual and social. With {17} all his limitations and difficulties, it is him, man himself, who makes what man is. His efforts may be and usually are painful. Yet man, we are told, has no other support but himself. That is why he rebels against the idea of a supreme being who in an extrinsic and gratuitous way may have created the world and mankind. The present-day man is an atheist, where atheism above all means an attitude against what has been received, against that particular idea of supreme being.

It is with this man, we are told, that Christianity has to establish a dialog. And the dialog is joined along a very precise line of Christianity. The point would be to demonstrate that, despite its enormous development, the life of man, after all is said and done, shows deep cracks; not only limitations and difficulties, but fissures that neither science nor politics nor society can heal. Furthermore, failure may happen at any moment. Every second man is capable of emptying himself and getting lost. Thus, we are told, Christianity would have to confront this man of today. First, to make him discover the existence of this aspect of his situation, a situation, which ultimately would be something derived from moral evil, from sin, i.e., man has need for salvation. And, in the second place, Christianity, not only teaches this necessity, but also offers him the possibility of achieving that salvation. Christianity would present itself, primarily and formally, as a religion of salvation.

Every dialog, I was saying, presupposes a point of coincidence. And the point of coincidence between present day man and Christianity would then be the indigence of life.

But reflection asserts itself: Is this the proper way to present the problem? What has just been said is not false. However, from my perspective, it lacks ultimate radicality not only on what refers to present day man, but also on what concerns Christianity. {18} Is it true that the primary and radical fracture of man is due to the flaws and deceptions of his life?

Undoubtedly, the man of today is in good measure an atheist. But his atheism, Is it primarily an “atheism-against”? I do not think so. The number of persons is ever growing who do not feel they are against anyone, remain serenely based, and dwell on their own lives. Without moving against anything or anyone their life is lived on itself, with difficulties, with failures, but also with real and actual achievements. This is the most radical form of atheism, the “a-theist” life. The description of modern man given above, therefore, is not quite in keeping with reality.

On the other hand, Is it true that Christianity is primarily and formally a religion of salvation? That Christianity is a religion of salvation cannot even be argued: the words “savior” (sotér) and “salvation” (sotería) do appear in the pages of the New Testament. And on this is based a great part of Christian thought today in its reaction against a speculative theology. But the question for me is different: Is Christianity primarily and formally a religion of salvation? Because if it were not, salvation would not be the constitutive moment of Christianity, but a moment posterior to it. In the symbol of Nicea we are told that the Word came down from heaven “for us men and for our salvation” (DS 125). One could then think that “for us men” is something “anterior” to “for our salvation”. Christianity is formally, in a Pauline expression, a mórphosis (cf. Rom 2:20), a divine conformation of the whole man, according to my interpretation, a deiformity. Christianity is salvation only because it is deiformation. This is one of the points in which modern theology appears insufficient to me. Christianity primarily addresses the whole being of man and not {19} his falling into sin, and much less the failures of his life. Christianity is not the cement that repairs the fissures of his life. Christianity, from my point of view, will tell modern man that his life is the way it is precisely because the being of man is deiform; and it is that way, not in its failures, but primarily and principally in its own achievements.

Consequently, one thing is clear. The point of coincidence between present day man and Christianity is not the indigence of life, but its fullness. When life rests more upon itself, it is then formally more in God and with God. Christian deiformation is the positive fundament of a plenary life resting upon itself. And this convergence, between the situation of present day man as fullness of life and Christianity as deiformation, is, from my point of view, that which drives the dialog².


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§ 2

THE CHARACTER OF THE DIALOG:
THE THEOLOGICAL PROBLEM OF MAN

We are dealing with an intellective reflection about the situation we indicated above. It is not simply a question of the ways through which man may reach God, but of the conceptiveness of the problem itself. Evidently, the ways anyone may devise to reach God are infinitely varied and, of course, none as complex as the one we are trying to develop here. I am not suggesting, not even remotely, that intellection may be the primary way to reach God. What happens is that an intellective dimension is never excluded from that way³. The purpose of these pages is not to “move”, but at least to try to know intellectively, to reach an intellective comprehension of the problem. The task is to find a lógos, an intellection, of what lógos is for present day man. It is, therefore, a “theo-logical” intellection. The form of the dialog will depend on the characteristic of the logos itself. What kind of logos is it?

It has had different characteristics throughout history.


I. The logos that reveals

The term lógos appears in the New Testament, but does not occupy a central position in it. It is only found in the first {21} two pages of the gospel of St. John. Perhaps other hands have had something to do here, besides the ones of the apostle, other inspired hands, perhaps belonging to St. Luke, which might be important for a vision of the unity of the New Testament writings, since St. Luke was a disciple of St. Paul⁴. Regardless of the historical origin for the use of the term lógos (whether in relation to Wisdom, or with respect to the Alexandrian thought of Philo, etc.), what is designated by it is a personal title of Christ in his characteristic as revealer of the Father. As such, from the beginning He was in God and was God.

This logos is what gives the Christian what St. Paul calls his mórphosis, his conformation in the knowledge of truth (mórphosis tes gnóseos kai tes aletheías, Rom 2:20), in contradistinction to ancient Israel whose mórphosis was based on the Law. In the Law, knowledge does not mean science, but knowledge acquired through an intimate dealing with something. The unity thus appears between the logos as personal attribute of Christ, and the mórphosis of man. As personally existent in Christ, and as conforming the knowledge and truth in man, the logos is not a theologic knowledge, i.e, a knowledge about revelation, but is the revelation itself. This is the logos that reveals.

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¹ This text on the theological logos was written by Zubiri as an introduction to the whole seminar of 1971 covering The theological problem of man: God, religion, Christianity (“El problema teologal del hombre: Dios, religión, Cristianismo”). This seminar included, in its first two parts, the subjects approached in Man and God (“El hombre y Dios”, Madrid, 1984), and The Philosophical Problem of the History of Religions (“El problema filosófico de la historia de las religiones”, Madrid, 1993).
² Of this mórphosis it has to give a lógos (note by X. Zubiri).
³ It is not a belief that is spontaneous; modulate this: from belief as a firm way the intellection itself starts (note by X. Zubiri).
⁴ According to a tradition found in St. Irenæus of Lyon, Adversos hæreses, vol. 3, ch. 1, in J.-P. Migne, Patrologiæ cursus completus, series græca, vol. 7, Paris, 1857, col. 845.