MAN AND HIS BODY
XAVIER ZUBIRI

From ESCRITOS MENORES (1953-1983),
Alianza Editorial, Madrid, 2006, pp. 103-116
(Original article El hombre y su cuerpo, appeared in the journal Asclepio, No. 25, 1973, pp. 9-19)

Translated by Joaquín A. Redondo, M.E., M.A. (Phil.)
2008


{103}

Man is a unique and single reality, he is a unity. He is not a union of two realities commonly called “soul” and “body”. Both terms are inadequate because what is intended to be meant by them depends essentially on the manner that unity of the human reality is understood. In addition, the idea of its activity also depends on the manner the unity of human reality is understood. Therefore, if we wish to conceptivize with a certain amount of precision what the title of this note of unity means, we must proceed by taking careful steps and progressively examine the following five points.
1. What is understood by reality.
2. What is human reality.
3. What type of characteristics the unity has.
4. What the function is in that reality of what we commonly call body.
5. What is the type of human activity.


I. What is reality?

Here, I do not refer to reality as such, but only to what we call “real things”, taking the term “thing” in {104} its most unspecified and common sense. Hence, real things are systems of notes with substantive characteristics. I shall explain.

1. Real things are constituted by “notes”. I take this term in its widest extension: notes are all the properties, qualities, constitutive parts, etc. Each one of these notes is there together with the others in a very precise way, it is a note “of” the others. For example, glucose is a note “of” an animal organism. This “of” is not an extrinsic addition. Each note can exist, and in general exists independently without having to be a note of this real thing. But when hic et nunc it is a note of this real thing, it is then integrated to it. And to be integrated means that it is not something merely added to the rest of the notes, but that the new note acquires the characteristic of being that “of” that is constitutive of the real thing. Therefore, there is no “note+of”, but rather “note-of”. This is what I have called, inspired by the Semitic languages, the “construct state” of every note. In what is called in the Semitic languages the “construct state” the unity of both terms is prosodic, morphological and semantic, it is a true unity. Due to this, the “of” is a moment not conceptive, but real of the note. And in second place, it is not a real relational moment, but a physically constitutive moment of each note, as long as it is a note of that real thing. Putting aside the metabolic processes, when glucose “leaves” the animal organism, it loses nothing except that “of”. The “of” is a “physical” moment of the note in the philosophical, not scientific sense of that term.

2. Each note has this characteristic of “note-of”. Of what? Of all the others. By virtue of this, the unity of what we call a real thing is the unity of an “of”. Each real thing is a construct of “notes-of”. Therefore, this unity is physical and primary. Physical in the sense I have just explained. And is primary {105} because here the diversity of notes does not compose the real thing by mere additions, but on the contrary, makes explicit the primary unity of all those “of” in which the thing consists. Things are not syntheses of notes, but those notes are an analysis of the primary unity in which the thing consists. This unity is what we call system, it is the unity of a construct of notes. System is not primarily a systematization of notes, but the unity of a construct. The “of” is the formal characteristic of the system as such. In the system its construct unity is constituted physically into the diversity of notes. As a consequence, this diversity is the explanation, so to speak, of the unity of the construct, it is precisely a structure. Structure is the actuality of the unity of a construct in the diversity of its notes. From this will follow, as we shall soon see, the possibility that a structure may retain its identity although its notes may even vary numerically. The “of” is the formal reason for the very sameness of a real thing.

3. The notes of a system have different characteristics. Some do presuppose an already constituted system and belong to it by the action of extrinsic factors to the system, these are adventitious notes. But there are others, that although they may have an exterior causal origin are formally by themselves the ones that constitute the system. Although this may sound tautological, we shall call them constitutional notes. These are the ones that confer to the real thing its primary physical structure. Since each note is a note “of” all the others of the system, it turns out that the notes constitute a cyclic system. Consequently, the system is a closed unity, in other words, it has constitutional sufficiency. Hence, the closed and cyclic system of constitutional notes is what constitutes substantivity. The formal reason for substantivity is the constitutional sufficiency. The structural unity of the real is a substantive constitution. The {106} substantivity is not substantiality. A very and identical substantivity could have a great number of substances that despite being substances would be non-substantive substances. The formal reason for substantivity, let me repeat, is constitutional sufficiency.


II. Human reality

Human reality is a unity of substantivity, namely, a primary and physical unity of its notes, a construct system of notes. Of these notes, some have physiochemical characteristics and others have psychic characteristics (for example, intelligence). The notes with physiochemical characteristics are usually called substances and so they are, but not in the metaphysical sense of substance, but in the common sense of the term, such as we use it, for example, when we talk about oily substances, piruvic acid, iron, phosphorous, etc. This refers to what we call chemical substances. The physiochemical aspect of human substantivity is not, as it is commonly said, “matter” (something quite vague and rather remote to be considered the formal constitution of the human substantivity), but is rather an organism. The organism is only a partial subsystem within the total system of human substantivity. By itself and in itself it lacks substantivity. The psychic aspect of human substantivity is also not what is called “spirit” (a very vague term). It could be called “soul” if this term were not overloaded with a most arguable special meaning, namely, that it is an entity located “inside” the body and “separable” from it. For this reason I would rather call this aspect simply “psyche”. The psyche is not a substance, neither in the common sense of the term (this is quite evident) nor even {107} in the metaphysical. The psyche is also only a partial subsystem within the total system of the human substantivity. Certainly, this subsystem has some characteristics irreducible to the organic subsystem and in many aspects (not in all, let us be clear) sometimes has a certain dominance over it. Nevertheless, the psyche is only a partial subsystem. This means that neither psyche nor organism constitute a system by themselves, it is rather the case that each subsystem is a system only by virtue of a mental consideration, not arbitrary, but also not adequate to reality. In its physical reality there is only the total system; as far as its real operations and structure, all and each of the psychic notes are “of” the organic notes, and each one of the organic notes is a note “of” the psychic notes. Therefore, man does not “have” psyche and organism, but “is” psycho-organic, because neither organism nor psyche, each by itself, has any substantivity; only the system has it. Because of this I think we cannot talk about a psyche without an organism. Let us say in passing, that when Christianity for example, talks about surviving and immortality the one that survives and is immortal is not the soul, but man, that is, the whole human substantivity. Anything else is not of faith¹. Man is not psyche “and” organism, but rather his psyche is formally and constitutively “psyche-of” this organism, and this organism is formally and constitutively “organism-of” this psyche. The psyche is organic by itself and the organism is psychic by itself. This moment of the “of” is numerically “identical” in the psyche and the organism, furthermore it incorporates a “physical” characteristic. This numerical and physical identity of the “of” is what formally constitutes the systematic unity of human substantivity. It is a structural unity; structure is precisely and formally the unity of an “of” in its notes. Hence, human substantivity {108} is “one” by itself and from itself. The moments of this substantive system codetermine each other, but not as potency and act (as the Aristotelians might put it) of a hylomorphic substantial unity, but as realities in act and ex aequo whose codetermination consists in each being “of” all the rest. The “of” is a unity of the metaphysical type superior to the unity of potency and act. Moreover, in this “of” not only the radical unity of human substantivity consists, but also the very sameness during its entire life, a sameness that is entirely different from the numerical persistence of all the notes, something perfectly inexistent. Consequently, man is a psychorganic substantivity.


III. Structural characteristics of human reality

This substantivity has three constitutive characteristics. The characteristics are not “properties” of substantivity, but rather the “structural type” of the primary unity of the psychorganic construct. Therefore, they are moments of the entire system as a system. They cannot be divided into organic and psychic. Each characteristic is a moment of the whole system.

1. By virtue of its systematic characteristic every note has a rigorously determined position with respect to all the other notes. Consequently, each note has a very precise meaning in the substantive system. Thus, weight has a precise biological meaning different from what the mere gravitational weight means. That meaning is a “function” in the widest sense of the term; that is the function, for example, of weight. And at the same time, that function is determined in and for the totality of the system. That determination formally constitutes what I call position, a structural position. {109} It is not a topographical or functional concept, but a structural one. The system determines the function of each note and the expression of this structural determination is the meaning. Thus, proteins have a very determined position in a living animal; but if the living is human, its position or structural determination is wider and therefore, different, for example, they have a function towards intellection or volition, etc. Reciprocally, these psychic notes have a very determinate position with respect to the proteins, every intellectual work necessarily mobilizes proteins, etc. Due to this position, the system has its own structural moment, it is organization. Here organization does not refer primarily to the physiochemical organism, as something different and contrary to the psyche, because it also embraces the very psychic notes themselves, in other words, it covers the entire psychorganic system. Organization is formally the precise structural determinant of each note, be it physiochemical or psychic, with respect to the others.

2. The psychorganic system, by virtue of the moment of organization has a compago, a complexion, according to which each one of the notes of the system, by being determined structurally with respect to the rest, necessarily reverberates structurally and functionally over all the others; has an interdependence with them. This way the organization establishes a certain “solidity”, this is the moment of solidarity. Solidarity is the interdependence of organization. There is a tendency to consider this the formal characteristic of a system, system would be interdependency. But that is not correct; the interdependence, the solidarity, is based on the unity of the system, which is that way because of its construct characteristic. Solidarity belongs to the system, but as a moment based on position, on organization. Has solidarity because it is system, it is not system {110} because it has solidarity. Each note is in solidarity with the rest, intelligence has solidarity with numerous psychorganic notes and vice-versa. Therefore, solidarity is a formal moment of the substantive system based on the organization, but is different from it.

3. This system thus organized and with solidarity still has a third moment. In its organization with solidarity the substantivity has actuality, has “physical” presentiality (in the strictly philosophical sense). Recalling the Spanish expression “acquires importance like a body” (Sp. tomar cuerpo) we might say that the psychorganic substantivity acquires the importance of body in the organization and solidarity of its notes. The primary unity, in which substantivity consists, acts as a body in the solidary organization of its notes. Body is, in this problem, the moment of physical presentiality of my psychorganic substantivity in reality. That moment is nothing but moment. It is that same substantivity in its moment of physical presentiality in reality. That is what I have usually called moment of corporeity. Corporeity does not mean here an abstract characteristic of something that might be a body, but is the abstract of “corporeal”. And corporeal is a characteristic of the whole human reality, of the entire psychorganic system. The physiochemical organism from itself makes that the entire system be formally and constitutively corporeal, in other words, makes the corporeity “of” the psyche. And the psyche is by itself formally and constitutively corporeal, thus, it is corporeity “of” its physiochemical organism. Corporeity, therefore, is a structural moment of the whole substantivity. It should be clear that this moment is not independent of the previous one. Without a psychorganic life there would be no corporeity. Corporeity is in fact founded on the solidary organization. All life is “physical” actuality in corporeity, and all corporeity, all “physical” presence, is a {111} living characteristic. But they are different moments. The living characteristic qualifies corporeity in such phenomena as the “expression”; corporeity is, among other things, an expression of life. One of the aspects of this expression is the “physiognomy”. Physiognomy is not only a set of material traits, but involves intrinsically and formally to be expression of the psychical. On the other hand, it is evident that corporeity qualifies the living substantivity, for example, “defining” the constitutional field of its actual reality. Life and corporeity are, therefore, two inseparable moments. However, I constantly repeat it, they have different formal characteristics. For example, the presence of a man to another is a question, above all, of his corporeity; on the other hand, the conduct of a man is, above all, a matter of organized and solidary living. Corporeity is actuality of “physical” presence.

Stated in general, the substantive psychorganic system in which human reality consists has three structural moments: organization, solidarity, corporeity. They are three moments of the entire system, and therefore, are structural moments of its construct unity. They are three moments of the “of” in which the substantive system consists. They are three moments, anthropologically and metaphysically differing from each other, where each one is based on the other.


IV. The function of “body”

In this psychorganic system, we say, there are two subsystems. One is he subsystem of all its physiochemical notes. The other is the subsystem we call psyche. We shall not deal with the psyche here. The first subsystem is usually called “body”. There is no problem with this, provided {112} we avoid identifying body, that is, the organism, with the moment of corporeity proper to the entire psychorganic system. For that reason it is better to use the term organism here. Now we ask, what is the function that corresponds to this subsystem in the entire system?

So far, the organism is not a substantive reality. Substantive reality does not belong to organism or the psyche, only the entire psychorganic system has it. It is not the case that organism may completely lack a certain systematic unity of its own. But it is not a unity of substantivity. That is precisely what the concept “subsystem” expresses. Subsystem is not a fragmentary system that may be included or placed in the total system, neither the psyche is encased in the organism nor the latter in the former. The subsystem is not a fragment, but a particular type of unity, which lacks, however, the moment of cyclic closure. If we start from physiochemical reactions and we wish to ascend to a complete determination of its characteristics within the system, a moment will arrive in which we shall have to appeal to the notes that are not physiochemical. Without an intellection that may recognize reality, and without an option in the intellection, there is no possibility (at the most properly human level) that the reactions may be determined constituting in principle an adequate response. Conversely, without some reactions quite precisely given, it would not be possible neither an intellection nor a volition. The organism and the psyche of a psychorganic substantivity lack a cyclic closed unity. Because of this, they are not substantive by themselves (Sp. de suyo). In our problem to be a subsystem precisely consists in a lack of closure.

Hence, the organism is a subsystem of physiochemical notes in the human substantivity. And of this subsystem we ask, what is the function it has in the total system? {113}

Putting it in general terms one thing is evident, this function does not consist and cannot consist in anything but being the material fundament of the three structural moments of human substantivity we have just indicated. It is from substantivity that we have to understand both psyche and organism and not the other way around.

1. Substantivity is above all an organization of the psychorganic notes. Organization is here, let us remember, determination of the structural position of each note in the total system. Hence, the material organism is a subsystem of organization of physiochemical notes. In this sense, the organism has above all, an organizing function, the contribution of the physiochemical notes to he organization of the total system. Although the term “organism” proceeds from this function, however, organism and organizing function must not be considered identical, because the organizing function is not the only function proper to an organism. An alteration of the organic subsystem would lead here to an alteration of the substantivity, and that would be an “indisposition” and borders the limit of mortal decomposition.

2. Substantivity has a moment of psychorganic solidarity, Thus, the function of the organism as subsystem consists, in this aspect, of being the material fundament of a moment of substantive solidarity. By virtue of this function the organism is a “figure” in which each part is connected in a certain order to all the rest. This unity of orderliness is a “figure” (dynamic, of course). This function of the organism, therefore, is a configurating function. That function presupposes the organizing function and rests upon it. All the functions of functional correlation, of integration, etc., and in general all the functions thanks to which, as it is improperly said, the organism functions {114} as a whole, are organizing functions. But thanks to them there is something different than mere organization, there is dynamic configuration. After all, one same unity of solidary configuration can have reality by putting into play very diverse physiochemical chain reactions. Every configuration is based on organization, but is not identified with it. However, it is a function strictly material of the organism; it is essential to underline this.

3. Finally, the psychorganic substantivity has a moment of corporeity, that is, a moment of actuality, of “physical” presentiality in reality. Here, the organism has its own function, namely, to be the material fundament of that presential actuality. Matter as fundament of actuality, of “physical” presentiality, is what should be called soma. The organism has this somatic function (as I have called it from my earliest writings). It is a function that differs from the organizing and the configurating. Therefore, let us not confuse soma and organism. Only by virtue of this function the organism should be called body. The organism is body, that is, soma, only by reason of being the material fundament of the corporeity of the system and not vice versa. Of course, this function, in fact, presupposes the organizing function and the configurating one; without these functions there would be no physical presentiality, but they are not formally identified with it. To be soma, to be body, is not formally identical to being a physiochemical organization. It is, however, a strictly material function. It is, if you will, somatic matter as different from organic matter. The former concerns the organism as fundament of actuality, the latter concerns it as fundament of organization.

In the end, that which we commonly call body has different functions, each founded on the previous one, but formally different from each other: organizing function, {115} configurating function, somatic function. Strictly speaking, as I mentioned above, we can only talk about body in reference to the third function. But if the functions are not differentiated it is better to talk about “organisms” only. Organism is the subsystem of physiochemical notes. And this subsystem has the triple organizing, configurating and somatic function. By virtue of these three functions, the organism is always and only a subsystem in the total psychorganic system of the substantivity.

The other subsystem is the psyche. As I mentioned above, I am not going to deal with it here. Except, that in order to conceptivize with more precision the type of unity of the psychorganic substantivity, we have to pay attention summarily to the character of its activity.


V. Human activity

Because it is a real system, it is, not only in itself, but also from itself, formally and constitutively active insofar as real. Each note of this substantivity acts systematically, that is, no note acts alone and on its own, so to speak, but rather, besides acting only through its internal properties, always acts as a “note-of”, that is, its activity is only a moment of the “activity-of” all the rest. Just as all the notes by virtue of being “notes-of” constitute one only substantive system, also what we call activity of each note is “activity-of”. All activities, therefore, constitute one only activity, the activity of the substantivity. That is what I express when saying that human activity is unitarily psychorganic in all, absolutely all, its acts. That unitarity does not mean only that human activity is “at the same time” organic and psychic, because that would assume there are two activities, {116} one psychic and another organic. What I affirm is exactly the opposite, namely, that there is but one single same activity, the one of the entire system in each and every one of its notes. Activity always has the characteristic of system. Certainly, this activity is by the same token complex, and in it some characteristics dominate more than others. But always, even in the act that may appear to be merely physiochemical, in reality, the entire system with all its physiochemical and psychic notes is always in activity. And, I repeat, it is not the case that one may be the “subject” of all his own activities, organic or psychic, but that the very activity is formally one and unique, it is a systematic activity by itself, due to being proper to the entire system, which in every act of its own is in activity in all its points; something like all the different levels and undulations of a liquid surface. Everything organic is psychic and everything psychic is organic, because everything psychic happens organically and everything organic happens psychically. Also, there is no actuation of the psychic over the organic, nor of the organic over the psychic, but only the actuation of a psychorganic state over another psychorganic state. This is so because the substantive reality of man is a system in which each note is always “note-of” all the rest, as moment of the construct unity in which this substantivity formally consists.

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¹ [Tr. note: The sentence "Anything else is not of faith" (Lo demás no es de fe) was removed from the Spanish text by the journal Salesianum, Anno XXXVI, No. 3, 1774, pp. 479-486, who reprinted it a year later]